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SARAH E. LIGHT†
Public lands and private enterprise exist in an uncomfortable equilibrium. Since
their founding, the national parks have embraced some forms of private enterprise,
including privately-run accommodations, to bring members of the public to the parks
to enjoy and appreciate their beauty. Corporations have provided financial support to
the national parks through philanthropy. And private firms have benefitted from
marketing their associations with the parks. Marketing campaigns that call on the
feeling of being in the woods and philanthropy to the parks that may benefit
corporations by association do not deplete resources or ruin aesthetic experiences like
a strip mine would. Yet they nonetheless in some fashion dilute the essential publicness
of the national parks. In debates over the purpose of public lands and the proper role
of private enterprise within them, relationships between private firms and public
lands in which the firms neither extract commodities from the parks nor physically
harm them have not received sufficient attention. This Article makes three claims.
First, as a descriptive matter, it identifies a set of non-extractive relationships between
private firms and national parks as a distinct phenomenon. Second, as a normative
matter, the Article argues that these relationships deserve greater attention in both
policy and scholarship because they shed light on important questions about the
significance of the public in national parks. Finally, as a prescriptive matter, the
Article concludes that these non-extractive relationships between private firms and
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the national parks warrant clearer restrictions in government policy to preserve the
essential publicness of these lands.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2019, an Advisory Committee to the Department of the Interior made
several recommendations designed to “improve the quality of National Park
Service (NPS) facilities:”1 “Our recommendations would allow people to opt
1 Louis Sahagun, Trump Team Has a Plan for National Parks: Amazon, Food Trucks, and No Senior
Discounts, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/201911-04/trump-administration-privatize-national-parks-tourism [https://perma.cc/Q2PP-DKXK].
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for additional costs if they want, for example, Amazon deliveries at a
particular campsite . . . . We want to let Americans make their own decisions
in the marketplace.”2 Consistent with this characterization of national parks
as a marketplace, the Committee noted that “evidence suggests that
occupancy rates at many campgrounds could grow and additional services,
from WiFi to utilities, equipment rentals and camp stores” among others
would “substantially boost net agency revenues, especially when operational
costs are transferred to private sector partners.”3 In addition, the Committee
recommended allowing concessioners4 both to make improvements to
campgrounds and to benefit financially from these improvements.5 The
prospect of Amazon deliveries and privatized campgrounds led some
conservation advocates to reject these proposals as a “transfer of public assets
to private industry.”6
Public lands and private enterprise have long existed in an uncomfortable
equilibrium.7 Since the creation of the national parks, the relationship
between people and these unique public lands has often been mediated and
facilitated by corporations and other business firms. In the nineteenth
century, major railroad companies actively supported the creation of the
national parks, convinced that these attractions would pull eastern
populations westward via rail.8 In the statutes creating the national parks,
Congress specifically authorized the provision of accommodations by private
See Id. (quoting Derrick Crandall, Vice Chairman, “Made in America” Outdoor Recreation
Advisory Comm.); see also Juliet Eilperin, Zinke Creates New Outdoor Recreation Panel Made Up Almost
Entirely of Industry Advisers, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2018, 3:53 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/zinke-creates-new-outdoor-recreationpanel-made-up-entirely-of-industry-advisers/2018/03/26/04f3e960-2f9a-11e8-8688-e053ba58f1e4_
story.html [https://perma.cc/3NMY-67AG] (“Crandall has also endorsed privatization as a way of
financing upgrades to campgrounds such as ready access to WiFi and hot showers, saying that
current ones ‘lack the amenities sought by today’s campers.’”); cf. Letter from Bill Yeargin, Chair,
Outdoor Recreation Advisory Comm. & Derrick Crandall, Vice Chair, Outdoor Recreation
Advisory Comm., to David L. Bernhardt, Sec’y Interior (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://www.nps.gov/orgs/1892/made-in-america-rac.htm
[https://perma.cc/YBZ4-B6VB]
[hereinafter Transmittal Letter]. Crandall is also the chief executive of the American Recreation
Coalition. Eilperin, supra.
3 Transmittal Letter, supra note 2, attach. 3.
4 The NPS refers to private entities holding concessions within the parks as “concessioners.”
54 U.S.C. § 101913.
5 Transmittal Letter, supra note 2, attach. 3.
6 Sahagun, supra note 1. On November 1, 2019, shortly after these recommendations were made
public, the NPS disbanded the Advisory panel, while noting that its recommendations were under
review. Rob Hotakainen, NPS Scraps Industry-Stacked Advisory Panel, E&E NEWS (Nov. 14, 2019,
2:37 PM), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061549123 [https://perma.cc/X2PQ-4WXW].
7 See, e.g., Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J. 991 (2014).
8 See Michael Mantell, Preservation and Use: Concessions in the National Parks, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q.
1, 6-10 (1979) (discussing the role of railroads in supporting the creation of the parks “to encourage
travel on their lines to the West” and their role in establishing hotels and other accommodations).
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firms to bring visitors and tourists to enjoy their beauty.9 Indeed, Stephen
Mather, the first director of the National Park Service, observed that
“[s]cenery is a hollow enjoyment to the tourist who sets out in the morning
after an indigestible breakfast and a fitful night’s sleep on an impossible bed.”10
Extractive corporate practices like mining, timbering, and fossil fuel
development,11 or even less extreme examples like recreational snowmobiling
9 See infra Section III.C. While the purpose of the national and state parks was to set aside
land for public use and recreation, the concept of who counted as a member of “the public” was not
always racially inclusive. See Reed Engle, Laboratory for Change, RES. MGMT. NEWSL. (Jan. 1996),
reprinted in Segregation and Desegregation at Shenandoah National Park, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Oct. 12,
2018), https://www.nps.gov/articles/segregation-and-desegregation-at-shenandoah.htm [https://
perma.cc/ AB3A-FPRX]; Kathryn Miles, Shenandoah National Park Is Confronting Its History,
OUTSIDE (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.outsideonline.com/2401541/shenandoah-national-parksegregation-history#close [https://perma.cc/AB3A-FPRX]. Between Reconstruction and World
War II, the NPS essentially followed local Jim Crow laws and customs in each park, designating and
constructing separate recreation and picnic facilities, as well as accommodations, for African
American visitors. See SUSAN SHUMAKER, UNTOLD STORIES FROM AMERICA’S NATIONAL
PARKS: SEGREGATION IN THE NATIONAL PARKS 21-22 (2009), http://www.pbs.org
/nationalparks/media/pdfs/tnp-abi-untold-stories-pt-01-segregation.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BH6M458] (offering a detailed discussion of segregation in the national parks and at national
monuments). This practice began to change in 1939 in Shenandoah National Park when the NPS
began to remove official signage indicating segregation by race, and developed an integrated picnic
ground. Id. at 29-30. On December 4, 1945, Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, issued a
regulation which prohibited discrimination in the furnishing of public accommodations within the
parks by the proprietors of any hotels, inns, lodges, or other public accommodations. Discrimination
in Furnishing Public Accommodations, 10 Fed. Reg. 14,866 (Dec. 8, 1945) (codified at 36 C.F.R.
§ 2.61). The Supreme Court held segregation of state and local parks to be unconstitutional in 1955.
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam). However, actual desegregation of
the parks proceeded more slowly in light of concessioner protests. Shumaker, supra, at 31-32; Engle,
supra. For the extensive documentation of the longstanding history of segregation within the state
parks, many of which were constructed with federal funds during the Great Depression, see
WILLIAM E. O’BRIEN, LANDSCAPES OF EXCLUSION: STATE PARKS AND JIM CROW IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH (2015). The history of segregation has had lasting effects. See CAROLYN
FINNEY, BLACK FACES, WHITE SPACES: REIMAGINING THE RELATIONSHIP OF AFRICAN
AMERICANS TO THE GREAT OUTDOORS 5 (2014) (“By excluding the African American
environmental experience (implicitly or explicitly), corporate, academic, and environmental
institutions legitimate the invisibility of the African American in the Great Outdoors and in all
spaces that inform, shape, and control the way we know and interact with the environment in the
United States.”).
10 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-302, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE:
CONCESSIONS PROGRAM HAS MADE CHANGES IN SEVERAL AREAS, BUT CHALLENGES
REMAIN 1 (2017) (quoting Stephen Mather, Former Director of the Park Service).
11 Although fossil fuel extraction and mining are widely practiced on public lands in the United
States, and some legacy claims for mining and extraction remain in the national parks, fossil fuel
extraction is not a major issue in the national parks. The 1976 Mining in the Parks Act closed the
national parks to any new mining claims. Pub. L. No. 94-429, 90 Stat. 1343 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1908). However, more than 1,000 legacy mining claims exist in fifteen of the parks. Mining Claims,
NAT’L PARK SERV. (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.nps.gov/subjects/energyminerals/mining-claims.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z6AQ-7ZT9]. Further, according to the NPS, about 200 national park units
contain nonfederal mineral rights claims. Other Energy and Mineral Development, NAT’L PARK SERV.
(Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.nps.gov/subjects/energyminerals/mineral-materials.htm
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tours that are merely noisy,12 physically harm nature and exclude members of
the public from enjoying these wonders. Some of these activities also
physically extract commodities from the parks for sale in private markets.
These activities are core to the notion of private property rights. Indeed,
many scholars of property law would argue that the right to exclude is the
sine qua non of private property rights.13 Others have focused on the right to
destroy.14 Such values associated with private property—exclusion,
commodification, and destruction—many would argue, have no place in the
parks, which must remain open to the public.15
However, not all commercial activity within the parks excludes the public
or destroys nature. Indeed, many commercial activities like providing
accommodations and recreational opportunities, corporate philanthropy to
the parks, and corporate cause-related marketing of associations with the
parks do not, on their face, appear to cause such physical harm.16 Nor do they
remove anything tangible from the parks and seek to commercialize or
commodify it for sale in markets. Marketing campaigns that call on the
feeling of being in the woods and philanthropy to the parks that may benefit
corporations by association do not deplete resources or ruin aesthetic
experiences like a strip mine would. Some of these corporate activities—like

[https://perma.cc/8LSE-SBPW]. Regulations govern the exercise of nonfederal mineral rights in
the parks. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.18, 9.30-9.210 (2019) (governing exercise of mineral rights and nonfederal oil and gas rights in the National Park System). However, the Trump administration has
sought to open more areas of public land to energy extraction. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82
Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017) (directing federal agencies to review regulations that “potentially
burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources”).
12 See, e.g., Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 674 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2012) (discussing
history of regulatory action by the NPS with respect to snowmobiles dating back to 1974, and
litigation dating back to 1997); Elizabeth Shogren, 15 Years of Wrangling Over Yellowstone Snowmobiles
Ends, NPR (Oct. 22, 2013, 4:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2013/10/22/239705610/new-rules-meanmore-and-cleaner-snow-mobiles-in-yellowstone [https://perma.cc/FUE3-H7JG]; 36 C.F.R. § 7.13
(2020) (regulating snowmobiles in Yellowstone National Park); 36 C.F.R. § 7.54 (2020) (same in
Theodore Roosevelt National Park); 36 C.F.R. § 7.66 (same in North Cascades National Park).
13 Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 752 (1998);
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE
L.J. 357, 360-64 (2001); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 711 (1986); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2
(defining property as the “sole and despotic dominion . . . over the external things of the world, in
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe”).
14 See e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005).
15 For a discussion of the value of publicness in the parks, see infra Section II.A.
16 Of course, it is conceivable that an overabundance of accommodations could lead to
significant congestion that itself could physically harm the parks. See, e.g., Mantell, supra note 8, at
3. But this Article aims to narrow its scope to focus on private corporate activity within the parks
that does not cause such harm, such as in the cases of a concession for an existing property that does
not increase the number of hotel rooms, disputes over ownership of the property’s famous name,
and corporate philanthropy to and cause-related marketing with the parks.
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philanthropy and cause-related marketing—actually contribute substantially
to park funding. Likewise, they do the opposite of exclusion—they bring
members of the public to the parks. Yet even such arguably benign actions
still raise objections about the proper role of corporations and other private
actors within the parks. The concern appears to be that these relationships in
some way dilute the essential publicness of the national parks. Commercial
activity within the parks that neither physically harms nature nor removes
physical assets for sale in markets thus focuses a spotlight on essential
questions about the proper boundary between public and private in the
national parks, the nature of publicness itself, and the purpose of the parks.17
This Article therefore seeks to highlight as a distinct phenomenon a set
of corporate interactions with the national (and in some cases, state) parks
that are commercial, but non-extractive and not physically harmful. It
identifies three case studies of such corporate interactions with the parks as
examples of this larger phenomenon: (1) corporate concessions within the
national parks for hotel accommodations; (2) corporate claims to ownership
of the names to historic hotels and other property; and (3) corporate
philanthropy to and cause-related marketing with national and state parks.
Each of these forms of interaction raises questions regarding the proper
balance between public and private when it comes both to ownership and
profit. A recently settled dispute over ownership of the trademarks to the
historic names of landmarked hotels within Yosemite National Park
exemplified the serious concerns about this boundary.18 Corporate
philanthropy to and cause-related marketing with both national and state
parks has led some conservation advocates to worry that these entanglements
will lead to the renaming of Coca-Cola Yellowstone or Amazon Grand
Canyon National Park.19 The states have adopted a continuum of approaches
17 For a discussion of the value of publicness in the context of the national parks, see infra
Section II.B. For a discussion of these issues in the context of urban public spaces, including
privately owned public open spaces, see Sarah Schindler, The “Publicization” of Private Space, 103
IOWA L. REV. 1093, 1100-04 (2018).
18 Sarah Kaplan, A Private Company Trademarked the Phrase ‘Yosemite National Park.’ Should the
U.S. Pay to Get It Back?, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2016/03/21/a-private-company-trademarked-the-phrase-yosemite-national-park-should-the-u-s-payto-get-it-back [https://perma.cc/PRT3-3TD6].
19 See infra Part II; Lisa Rein, Yosemite, Sponsored by Starbucks? National Parks to Start Selling
Some Naming Rights, WASH. POST (May 9, 2016, 10:23 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/powerpost/wp/2016/05/09/yosemite-national-park-brought-to-you-by-starbucks [https://
perma.cc/AFP6-6VMU] (“A Coca-Cola Visitor Center will still be off limits, but an auditorium at
Yosemite National Park named after Coke will now be permitted . . . . And parkgoers could sit on a
bench named for Humana health insurance—and store their food in a bear-proof locker emblazoned
with the Nike swoosh.”); Joe Davidson, Park Service and Corporate Advertising, a Dangerous Mix,
WASH. POST (May 9, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
powerpost/wp/2016/05/09/park-service-and-corporate-advertising-a-dangerous-mix
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to corporate philanthropy and cause-related marketing with state parks. At
the most restrictive end of the spectrum, California requires a nexus between
the donor firm’s business and outdoor recreation.20 At the opposite end,
Tennessee has entered into an agreement with a local brewery that sells “State
Park Blonde Ale” with an image of the state naturalist on the label, and with
a portion of the proceeds going to benefit the Tennessee State Park system.21
Corporations benefit from these relationships through direct profit (in the
case of hotel accommodations) and, more indirectly, by building brand
awareness and improving the broader perception of their brands through a
“halo effect” of association with these beloved national icons.22 These benefits
for the corporations come, in some cases, with corresponding benefits to the
parks in the form of cash or in-kind donations. Indeed, these forms of
corporate activity offer an arguable counterpoint to the twin harms of
exclusion and destruction. They provide lodging for visitors, funding for
enhanced access for underserved populations, and can fund trail repairs. But
they can also impose intangible harm on the national parks and their
reputations. At the very least they raise the risk of “stigma by association”23
if ever these corporate partners were to suffer an injury to their reputation or
corporate scandal. And they raise concerns about co-optation of public
priorities by private interests. Considered together, these interactions require
a deeper exploration of the proper scope of corporate activity within the
parks, and how prescriptive the law should be about expanding or limiting
that role in different contexts.
These issues are significant. The national parks are big business. A recent
report by the U.S. Department of the Interior found that national park
visitors generated $40.1 billion in economic output in 2018, supporting
329,000 jobs both within the parks themselves, and in surrounding
communities near national parks, in industries like hotels, restaurants,

[https://perma.cc/7W8T-4NQ8] (“Already parks hoist banners with Budweiser beer and other
corporate logos. Where will it stop? Can you imagine Disney presents Yellowstone?”). The law
expressly prohibits the naming of national parks after sponsors. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
20 See infra Section III.B.3.
21 See infra Section III.B.3; State Park Blonde Ale, TENN. BREW WORKS, https://www.
tnbrew.com/beer/stateparkblonde [https://perma.cc/TMJ2-JLT8]; Christian Spears, Tennessee Brew
Works Expands Philanthropic Efforts to Tennessee State Parks, CRAFTBEER.COM (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.craftbeer.com/news/brewery-news/tennessee-brew-works-expands-philanthropicefforts-to-tennessee-state-parks [https://perma.cc/PTT3-3XM7].
22 See infra Section IV.A.
23 Elizabeth Pontikes, Giacomo Negro & Hayagreeva Rao, Stained Red: A Study of Stigma by
Association to Blacklisted Artists During the “Red Scare” in Hollywood, 1945 to 1960, 75 AM. SOCIO. REV.
456 (2010); Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Kate Odziemkowska & Elizabeth Pontikes, Bad Company:
Tactics, Stigma, and Shifts in Support for Environmental SMOs after the Horizon Oil Spill (Dec.
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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transportation and recreation.24 That figure represents a fifty percent increase
in visitor spending since 2012.25 According to a Report by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), in 2015, 488 commercial concessioners within
the national parks earned total gross revenues of $1.4 billion, yet paid only
approximately $104 million in franchise fees to the NPS.26 In 2015, each of
the five largest concession contracts for lodging, food, and retail services in
the parks generated more than $50 million in gross revenues.27 With respect
to corporate philanthropy and cause-related marketing, for fiscal year 2018,
corporations contributed $31.1 million to the parks.28 And while the COVID19 pandemic may affect these numbers for 2020, there is no doubt that
reopening of the national parks during the pandemic has been
symbolically important.29
Despite the widespread nature and economic significance of these
corporate relationships, they have not received sustained attention as such in
legal scholarship on the national parks. Within the literature on the national
parks, many scholars have examined the appropriate balance between current
use and preservation for future generations of these public lands,30 including

24 Press Release, National Park Visitor Spending Contributed $40 Billion to U.S. Economy
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (May 23, 2019), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/national-park-visitorspending-contributed-40-billion-us-economy [https://perma.cc/NF2J-CEK4]. The Report found
that “318 million visitors spend $20.2 billion in communities within 60 miles” of a national park, and
that of the 329,000 jobs supported by this economic activity, “more than 268,000 jobs” are located
in “park gateway communities.” Id.
25 Id. (showing that in 2012, visitors spent $26.8 billion).
26 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-302, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE:
CONCESSIONS PROGRAM HAS MADE CHANGES IN SEVERAL AREAS, BUT CHALLENGES
REMAIN 4 (2017).
27 Id. at 5. These contracts were for lodging, food, and retail services in Yosemite, Yellowstone,
and the Grand Canyon national parks, as well as the Statute of Liberty National Monument and
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area. Id.
28 NAT’L PARK FOUND., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (2018), https://www.nationalparks.org/
about-foundation/financial-reports [https://perma.cc/ZE6J-4J2N]. In addition, individuals and
family foundations collectively donated a total of $34.3 million to the parks. Id. In 2018, institutional
foundations contributed $9 million and government grants contributed $10.3 million. Id.
29 Rob Hotakainen, ‘The Parks Are Opening, and Rapidly.’ But It’s Complicated, E&E NEWS
GREENWIRE (May 14, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1063135399 [https://perma.cc/KY63XDX6].
30 John Copeland Nagle, How National Park Law Really Works, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 861, 863
(2015) (identifying and discussing the ongoing conflict between “use” and “preservation” as core to
the Organic Act that created the national parks in 1916). For discussions about the history and
purpose of the national parks, see generally MICHAEL FROME, REGREENING THE NATIONAL
PARKS (1992); JOHN ISE, OUR NATIONAL PARK POLICY: A CRITICAL HISTORY (1961); ALFRED
RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (4th ed. 2010); JOHN MUIR, OUR
NATIONAL PARKS (Gibbs Smith 2018) (1901); JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT
HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL PARKS (1980); RICHARD WEST SELLARS,
PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY (copy. 2009).
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between “quiet” and “noisy” forms of use.31 Some of these debates appear to
turn, at least in part, on whether the use at issue imposes physical harm. For
example, whether to permit snowmobiles or e-bikes in the national parks
raises issues not only of whether noisy or quiet recreation within the parks is
consistent with their purpose, but also the very practical question of whether
the addition of mechanized vehicles would harm nature, cause erosion of the
trails, spook the wildlife, or create noise pollution that would limit the
enjoyment of those seeking quieter forms of recreation and contemplation.32
More recent debates have focused on the issue of congestion within the parks
and how increasing congestion affects the use/preservation debate. With
respect to corporate activity in the parks, several articles have examined the
law governing concessions within the parks, and one student note has
examined the trademark dispute between a concessioner and the NPS over
ownership of the names of historic hotels.33 However, these scholars have not
identified concessions or the trademark dispute as examples of a broader
category of corporate activity that is arguably neither exclusionary of the
public, physically harmful, nor extractive of goods for commercial purposes.34
Although legal scholars have examined the tax and corporate governance
consequences of corporate philanthropy and cause-related marketing,35 and
one article has addressed the phenomenon of individual “patriotic
philanthropy” to government agencies,36 no legal scholarship appears to focus
31 JOSH EAGLE, JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW AND POLICY 196 (2017); cf. Sarah Krakoff, Mountains Without Handrails . . . Wilderness Without
Cellphones, 27 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 417 (2003).
32 Policy Memorandum 19-01 from Deputy Dir., Nat’l Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior to
the Reg’l Dirs., Assoc. & Assistant Dirs., Superintendents, and Chief of the U. S. Park Police, Nat’l
Park Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nps.gov/
subjects/policy/upload/PM_19-01 [https://perma.cc/2P2Q-K8H9] (permitting use of pedal-assist ebikes where ordinary bicycles are permitted).
33 Megan Elaine Ault, Note, This Name Is Your Name: Public Landmarks, Private Trademarks,
and Our National Parks, 67 DUKE L.J. 145 (2017) (focusing on using the trademark implications of
this dispute as a way to preserve the parks from commercial intrusion).
34 See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Concessions Law and Policy in
the National Park System, 74 DENV. L. REV. 729, 730, 734 (1997) (discussing the origin of the national
parks and concessions policy through the Concessions Policy Act of 1965); Mantell, supra note 8, at
5 (arguing for an “urgent reevaluation by policy makers of concessions management” and focusing
on heavy visitation encouraged by concessioners as inconsistent with the dual purposes of the parks).
35 See, e.g., Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of
Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997); Terri Lynn Helge, The Taxation of Cause-Related
Marketing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883 (2010); Roy Shapira, Corporate Philanthropy as Signaling and
Co-optation, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1889 (2012).
36 Margaret H. Lemos & Guy-Uriel Charles, Patriotic Philanthropy? Financing the State with
Gifts to Government, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1129, 1157, 1165, 1170 (2018) (discussing philanthropy by
wealthy individuals and foundations like the Gates Foundation for pet projects in education, health
care, and other contexts, but not focusing on corporate philanthropy to national or state parks). For
more on the term “patriotic philanthropy,” see id. at 1132 (citing Eleanor Clift, Patriotic Philanthropy:
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squarely on these issues in the context of corporations and the national (and
state) parks or as an example of this larger phenomenon.
Holly Doremus has come the closest to this issue, offering an in-depth
account of corporate “bioprospecting” in Yosemite’s hot springs for biological
substances with potential medical uses.37 Doremus contends that while
bioprospecting is done at such a small scale as to avoid physically harming the
park, it nonetheless interferes with the park’s purpose to inspire wonder and
awe.38 While the bioprospecting project that Doremus discussed may not
have physically harmed the parks, bioprospecting nonetheless extracts
something physical from them for commercial benefit and commodification,
even if the thing that is commodified is very small.
This Article therefore advances the literature by isolating the question of
whether corporate activity within the national parks poses concerns about a
loss of publicness that warrant policy responses, even if that corporate activity
does not exclude the public, commoditize a natural asset within the parks, or
physically harm nature. Marketing campaigns that call on the feeling of being
in the woods do not deplete resources or ruin aesthetic experience like fossil
fuel extraction does. Private ownership of a trademark to the name of a
historic hotel in Yosemite National Park does not exclude anyone from
staying at the hotel; nor does it otherwise implicate stewardship of the land
for future generations.
In other words, these non-extractive corporate relationships with the
parks do not “use” the land or interfere with “preservation” of its resources
in ways that implicate traditional debates over “use” versus “preservation.”
Nor do they commodify goods within the parks in the traditional sense by
removing or allowing the removal for commercial benefit of timber, fossil
Not an Oxymoron, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 27, 2014, 5:54 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/patrioticphilanthropy-not-an-oxymoron [https://perma.cc/7ZAS-B5TM]; Sophie Gilbert, David Rubenstein’s
Patriotic Philanthropy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2014/10/david-rubensteins-patriotic-philanthropy/382082/ [https://perma.cc/DMD9-RN6P]).
37 Holly Doremus, Nature, Knowledge and Profit: The Yellowstone Bioprospecting Controversy and
the Core Purposes of America’s National Parks, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 403-04 (1999) (identifying the
phenomenon of “bioprospecting,” in which biotechnology companies seek to discover useful
microorganisms for commercialization).
38 Id. at 404 (noting that this process leads to “no detectable physical or biological impact on
the park”). In the context of bioprospecting, Doremus contends that the national parks are about
more than their physical resources:
The symbolism of the national parks is nearly as important to the nation
as the natural resources they harbor. The fundamental purpose of the national
parks is not merely to preserve nature. They should also inspire the populace
with wonder, awe and fascination of nature, express the nation’s respect for its
natural wonders, and make those wonders available to all on an equal basis.
Id. at 406. Thus, she offers a Kantian critique of bioprospecting, contending that even when physical
harm is not at issue, there remains a concern about preserving the parks’ “inspirational and
expressive functions.” Id. at 407.
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fuels, or biological substances. The parks themselves remain open to the
public and no one is excluded from their use and enjoyment. Yet these
corporate actions appear to work some kind of mischief—they are
commodification in a different form.39 They are still somehow disaggregating
the bundle of public goods and values—including public goodwill—
associated with public lands, just in a different way from extractive industries.
This Article offers both a descriptive account of these non-extractive
corporate interactions with the parks, and a normative account of what these
relationships tell us about the nature of publicness in the national parks.
Finally, it offers a set of prescriptions for the role that corporations ought to
play within these public lands.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I offers a brief primer on the
creation of the National Park System in the United States and introduces the
traditional debate between preservationists and conservationists over the
purpose of the parks. Part II examines the question of why the parks ought
to be public at all. It first offers a normative account of publicness that
embraces both the values to individuals and to the nation as a whole of
commitments to public lands. It then takes a deep dive into the origin of the
parks that focuses on concerns about preserving the parks’ publicness against
private and corporate encroachment. This Part concludes with the
observation that the statutes creating the parks accepted at least some role for
private enterprise, most notably concessions for accommodations. Part III
examines two more contemporary cases studies: a recent dispute over
ownership of trademarks to landmarked properties, and corporate
philanthropy/cause-related marketing of associations with the parks. Part IV
offers a normative assessment of the benefits of such interactions to
corporations and potential benefits and harms to the parks, drawing on social
science literature about corporate social responsibility. Finally, this Article
concludes in Part V by arguing that the law governing the parks should be
most concerned about exclusion, commodification of natural assets, and
physical destruction. Yet the more intangible, associational harms identified
here still demand caution and warrant more proactive policy responses.
I. CONSERVATION, PRESERVATION, AND THE NATIONAL PARKS
The history of the creation of the national parks is intertwined with the
normative question of why land ought to be set aside for public use in the
39 For a broad discussion of commodification, see generally Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). In Radin’s account, “[s]omething that is marketinalienable is not to be sold, which in our economic system means it is not to be traded in the
market.” Id. at 1850. In other words, certain goods ought not be commoditized.
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first place—a question that continues to have many, sometimes conflicting,
answers. This Part focuses on the legal basis for creating the parks, and the
debate between conservationists and preservationists over their purpose—
whether the land should be used most efficiently subject to the limitation of
preservation for future generations, or whether the space should be preserved
in its natural state to inspire wonder and awe.
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution grants Congress the
authority to designate and make laws regarding public lands, stating that
“Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”40 The
Supreme Court has held that this power is “without limitations,”41 and has
interpreted it to include the authority to adopt appropriate rules governing
safety and use of public lands, for example to protect wildlife.42
But why set aside land as national “parks” for public use at all?43 Legal
scholars, philosophers, and naturalists, among others, have long debated the
value or values that the national parks should promote.44 Two primary
approaches have dominated this discussion: preservation and conservation.
Preservationists argue that public lands should be preserved in their natural
state as spaces of inspiration and contemplation in which people can achieve
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30 (1940) (holding that Congress may
expand or limit the public domain “to avoid monopoly and to bring about a widespread distribution
of benefits”).
42 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541 (1976).
43 Other forms of public land in the United States, including National Forests managed by the
U.S. Forest Service, National Wildlife Refuges managed by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, and
National Conservation Areas managed by the Bureau of Land Management have different purposes.
America’s Public Lands Explained, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: BLOG (June 13, 2016),
https://www.doi.gov/blog/americas-public-lands-explained [https://perma.cc/RR8H-QR34]. These
various forms of public land display a “structured normative pluralism. [Public-lands law] integrates
a range of competing values: privatization and extraction; motorized recreation and hunting; scenic
preservation, hiking, and solitude; and ecological preservation and biodiversity.” Jedediah BrittonPurdy, Whose Lands? Which Public? The Shape of Public-Lands Law and Trump’s National Monument
Proclamations, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 921, 939, 948-49 (2018) (noting the strong presumption in the law
against presidential privatization of public lands to avoid corruption). For a sweeping theoretical
discussion of how the concept of “nature” has evolved as a form of democratic self-governance
throughout American history, see Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change,
Environmental Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122 (2010). The focus of this Article, however, is
the national (and state) parks, which embody a “far narrower range of potential uses” than other
forms of public land. Britton-Purdy, supra, at 942. The most limited form of public land management
is set forth in the Wilderness Act, which mandates the preservation of the lands’ “wilderness
character” by permitting only “solitude” and “primitive and unconfined types of recreation.” Id. at
943 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1131).
44 See supra note 30.
40
41
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transcendence and separation from their daily lives.45 This preservationist
approach is embodied in the life work of co-founder of the Sierra Club John
Muir,46 and landscape architect Frederick Law Olmstead.47 Muir and the
preservationists were influenced by “Romantic and Transcendentalist
aesthetics” that valued “certain kinds of aesthetic and spiritual experience”
that could be found only in “spectacular natural settings” like the parks.48 This
preservationist approach contrasts with that of the conservationists.49
Conservationists, including Gifford Pinchot, the first head of the U.S. Forest
Service, instead contended that public lands should be actively managed by
experts to promote their best and most efficient use—a utilitarian approach—
subject to the limitation that the land is conserved for the benefit of future
generations.50 Thus, at the time of the parks’ creation, the conservation
approach was consistent with some substantial commercial use of public
lands, though in highly regulated form.51 And while there were significant
limits on what forms of commercial use could occur within the national parks,

MUIR, supra note 30; Doremus, supra note 37.
See MUIR, supra note 30; JOHN MUIR, THE YOSEMITE (1912); JOHN MUIR, NATURE
WRITINGS (William Cronon ed., 1997).
47 See infra notes 106–113 and accompanying text.
48 Purdy, supra note 43, at 1139. Notably, as with the racially exclusionary history of the national
parks themselves, the Sierra Club has recently acknowledged John Muir’s racism and attitudes
toward people of color. The Sierra Club itself excluded people of color from membership, much as
the parks themselves excluded people of color in the Jim Crow South. Michael Brune, Pulling Down
Our Monuments, SIERRA CLUB (July 22, 2020), https://www.sierraclub.org/michaelbrune/2020/07/john-muir-early-history-sierra-club [https://perma.cc/NS9W-NHGU] (noting that
Muir’s harmful racist words and promotion of stereotypes “continue to hurt and alienate Indigenous
people and people of color who come into contact with the Sierra Club”). Thus, it is important to
take with a grain of salt sweeping pronouncements by the parks’ founders about the importance of
making these lands open to “the public.”
49 Of course, the idea that nature serves as a place to inspire wonder and awe in the human
imagination—an idea embraced by preservationists—cannot be characterized as insensitive to
consequences or as fully non-instrumental in nature.
50 For example, Pinchot unsuccessfully sought to place the parks under the management of the
Forest Service; however, Stephen Mather, the first Director of the Park Service succeeded in arguing
that the “Forest Service’s mission of commercial exploitation of natural resources would destroy the
parks.” Doremus, supra note 37, at 470 (citing SELLARS, supra note 30, at 58). Of course, this debate
completely sidesteps the question of who the land belonged to before it was set aside for “public”
use. Offering an account based in critical ethnic studies, environmental justice, and critical
geography, Sarah Krakoff extensively examines this question as it relates to the Native nations who
were dispossessed of these lands. Sarah Krakoff, Not Yet America’s Best Idea: Law, Inequality, and
Grand Canyon National Park, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 559 (2020). For an in-depth history of the
conservation movement in the United States, see generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND
THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920
(Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 1999) (1959).
51 See generally HAYS, supra note 50 (discussing promotion by conservationists like Pinchot of
commercial use with regulation in contexts of water power rights, mineral extraction, grazing, and timbering,
among others).
45
46
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Pinchot strongly believed that even the parks should be open to efficient
management.52
The debate between these two perspectives was perhaps best embodied in
a dispute in the early twentieth century between Muir and Pinchot regarding
whether a river flowing through the Hetch Hetchy Valley ought to be
dammed to provide water to the City of San Francisco.53 The river lay within
what had been designated by Congress as Yosemite National Park. A dam
would flood the Valley, destroying the ability of the public to enjoy its
splendor. Pinchot argued that the benefits to San Francisco were significant
and outweighed any interest in leaving the river and Valley in their natural
state.54 Muir rejected this utilitarian approach, contending that it was
equivalent to damming “the people’s cathedrals and churches, for no holier
temple has ever been consecrated by the heart of man.”55 In his view, any
exploitation of natural resources for instrumental benefit was dangerous and
would lead down a slippery slope.56 In 1913, Congress gave the victory to
Pinchot’s approach when it passed the Raker Act and granted to the City of
San Francisco a right of way “in, over, and through” the land in Yosemite
National Park to dam the river.57 By 1923, the dam was in place and the
Valley flooded.58
This controversy highlighted the distinction between conservation and
preservation. However, the dispute was not about commercial use. Rather,
the debate over Hetch Hetchy exposed the tradeoffs between two forms of
public interest: that of preserving the park in its natural splendor, and that of
the City of San Francisco in its need for water for its population.59
While unsuccessful in stopping the construction of the dam, Muir’s
position favoring preservation prevailed in some significant ways thereafter.
Three years after passing the Raker Act, in 1916, Congress passed the Organic
Act that created the National Park System and the National Park Service
(NPS).60 The Act’s statement of purpose declared that the NPS shall
promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks,
monuments, and reservations hereinafter specified by such means and
measures as conform to the fundamental purposes of the said parks,
52 Id.
53 RUNTE, supra
54 RUNTE, supra
55 JOHN MUIR,

note 30, at 78-95; HAYS, supra note 50, at 192-97.
note 30, at 78-95.
Hetch Hetchy Valley, in JOHN MUIR, NATURE WRITINGS 810, 817
(William Cronon ed., 1997).
56 Doremus, supra note 37, 440 n.201.
57 Act of Dec. 19, 1913, Pub. L. 63-41, § 1, 38 Stat. 242, 242.
58 RUNTE, supra note 30, at 78-95.
59 HAYS, supra note 50, at 193 (“[C]onflict between two public uses of the Valley was the crux
of the controversy”).
60 Act of Aug. 25, 1916, Pub. L. 64-235, § 1, 39 Stat. 535, 535.
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monuments, and reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for
the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.61

Thus, the Organic Act stated that the purpose of the parks was both
preservation of the scenery and natural wonders for future generations and
enjoyment of those wonders in the present. The Act created the NPS as a
distinct entity within the Department of the Interior. This decision to situate
the new NPS outside of the U.S. Forest Service that Pinchot controlled
according to utilitarian/conservationist principles took place over Pinchot’s
strenuous objections.62 By designating both preservation and current
enjoyment as goals—goals that are sometimes in conflict—the Act left a
significant degree of discretion to the new NPS to determine how to balance
among those competing considerations.63
This debate over the purpose of the parks continues to the present day.
With minor modifications, this dual purpose of conservation “for the
enjoyment of future generations” and providing “for enjoyment” in the
present remains in the current statutory language.64 This language speaks to
the tension between the present and the future. It has generated serious
debate for over one hundred years as to the appropriate balance between these
two interests.65
To highlight just one example of the ongoing importance of what has
come to be known as the use/preservation debate, Holly Doremus has
discussed whether the NPS should enter into agreements with private firms
to permit “bioprospecting” in the thermal pools of Yosemite.66 Doremus has

61 Id. (emphasis added); see Nagle, supra note 30, at 862-63 (2015) (citing this as language
authored by Frederick Law Olmstead, Jr., son of Frederick Law Olmstead, the American landscape
architect who designed Central Park); see also National Park Service: Hearing on H.R. 434 & H.R.
8668 Before the H. Comm. on Pub. Lands, 64th Cong. 52, 52 (1916) (statement of J. Horace McFarland,
President, American Civic Associations) (stating that Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. “framed” this
sentence of the Organic Act, and that the “fundamental thing that was in mind at the time was to
be sure that there should be in the bill . . . a statement of what the parks were for”).
62 See supra note 60; HAYS, supra note 53, at 195-97.
63 Nagle, supra note 30, at 867-90. Use conflicts in the environmental law context are not unique
to the national parks. See generally Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Harms, Use Conflicts, and Neutral
Baselines in Environmental Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 1505 (2011).
64 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (“The Secretary . . . shall promote and regulate the use of the National Park
System by means and measures that conform to the fundamental purpose of the System units, which
purpose is to conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in the System units and
to provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in such manner
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”).
65 Nagle, supra note 30, at 863-65 (documenting examples of the use/preservation debate and
observing that the NPS retains significant discretion to balance among these sometimes conflicting goals).
66 Doremus, supra note 37, at 406.
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argued that the purpose of the parks includes preserving their symbolism and
capacity to inspire awe.67 Doremus thus offers a modern preservationist,
Kantian vision of what kinds of scientific research should be permitted within
the parks. She contends that “appreciative science”—a form of scientific
research that has as its intent the understanding of nature—is permissible.68
However, “instrumental science”—a form of research experimentation that
sends the message that “nature has value not in itself, but only as a means
toward human ends”—has no place in the parks and is “not the message parks
should communicate.”69 She notes that the “contrast between the
instrumental and appreciative scientific traditions closely parallels that
between Gifford Pinchot’s conservationist and John Muir’s preservationist
views of the function of parklands.”70 Thus, bioprospecting implicates the
use/preservation distinction that frames many debates over the purpose of
the parks.
But the use/preservation distinction does not fully capture concerns
regarding the role of private commercial activity within the parks. Individuals
and non-profit organizations can “use” or seek to “preserve” the parks just as
corporations can. A non-profit university or hospital could seek to engage in
bioprospecting instead of a commercial firm for the purpose of finding lifesaving medicine rather than for the purpose of “understanding nature”.
Individuals can participate in “noisy” forms of recreation that interfere with
preservation for future generations or “quiet” forms of enjoyment that do not
cause harm. And private corporations can interact with the parks in ways that
do not exclude members of the public, that impose no physical harm on the
parks, and that do not physically extract any goods. In other words,
corporations can interact with the parks in ways that do not implicate either
“use” or “preservation” in the traditional senses.
The next Part turns to the question of why we value publicness in the
parks, and then offers a more detailed origin story of the parks that
specifically highlights early and ongoing concerns about the role of private
commercial enterprise.
II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THE PARKS
The tension over the appropriate balance between use and preservation
was not the only significant debate as the parks were being created. Indeed,
67 Id. at 406-07. While the bioprospecting agreement suggested that the practice would not
physically harm the park, it would still remove certain natural compounds from the thermal pools
for testing and, potentially, for commercial sale. Id. at 407-10.
68 Id. at 458.
69 Id. at 459.
70 Id.
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there were explicit debates about why the parks should be public, concerns
about encroachment of private interests, and acknowledgement that some
role for private enterprise could be appropriate. This Part first offers a
normative and theoretical account of the value of publicness in the national
parks. It then offers a more nuanced historical narrative about the creation of
the parks that focuses on the public-private boundary. The designation of the
parks was bound up with a distinct set of worries about how private property
could lead to the exclusion of members of the public from the enjoyment of
these natural wonders, commodification of the wonders themselves, and
destruction of nature. And the story is intertwined with the creation of our
collective national identity.
A. The Value of Publicness in the Parks
This discussion of the origin of the parks and their uneasy relationship
between public and private raises a foundational question: what is the value
of public space being public, rather than private? And in this specific context,
why do we value public national parks, when there are other potential ways to
enjoy nature? One alternative, for example, could include large parks owned
by a private but generous individual or corporation, to which the public has
access.71 This Article takes a pluralistic approach to the value of publicness in
the parks, acknowledging many different values that have evolved over time.
Most importantly, these values include not only those of importance to
individuals but also collective value to the community and nation as a whole.
Scholars have offered accounts of the values that public spaces provide in
many contexts. For example, with respect to urban public spaces like town
squares, local parks, and sidewalks, Sarah Schindler has argued that such
spaces are valuable as public spaces rather than private ones because they
“foster[] interaction between people with diverse viewpoints and from
different socio-economic backgrounds,” “nurture democratic values” by
providing spaces to assemble and speak, afford people a “third place” beyond

71 There may be some forms of private property that guarantee benefits to the public into the
future, such as private trusts, conservation easements, and other covenants that run with the lands
to preserve them in perpetuity. See generally Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural
Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 119 (2010)
(discussing concerns about fraud and inefficiency in conservation easements and private land trusts
and recommending reforms). Yet these private mechanisms of conservation did not come into
widespread use until the 1950s. And while they are creative, they have been criticized as inefficient
and subject to fraud and abuse. Id. Indeed, the first conservation easement in the 1880s served to
protect “Frederick Law Olmstead’s Boston parkways,” and the NPS used easements in the 1930s to
“protect its parkways as well.” Id. at 127. Notably, these early easements were held by public entities,
not private ones. Id. at 126 (“Until the 1950s, conservation easements were used only sporadically
and were held exclusively by governmental organizations.”).
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home and work to interact, and create spaces “for those with nowhere else to
go” like the homeless.72 While some of these values may have purchase in the
parks context, national parks are not like the local town square that provides
a public forum for public speeches, nor are they necessarily havens for the homeless.
As the following historical narrative demonstrates, the founders of the
parks valued their publicness explicitly because it could limit the potential
harms associated with private ownership of property—including the potential
for destruction of natural resources, exclusion of anyone from enjoying of
their beauty, and commodification of goods for profit. By virtue of the parks’
publicness, all members of the public—at least in an ideal world, if not the
world in which the parks originated—ought to be welcome to enjoy their
beauty and splendor, from the richest to the poorest in the nation.73 The
parks’ public nature—the fact that governments hold them in trust for the
public interest—would ensure that they will not be destroyed or carved up
into pieces. Their publicness would guarantee that members of the public of
limited means could not be charged fees or tolls to enjoy their splendor.
Rather, these awe-inspiring places would be preserved both for the enjoyment
of today, and for the benefit of future generations.74
The benefits noted thus far can be styled as benefits to individuals—the
ability of anyone, of any means, to enjoy these spectacular places and be
inspired with awe and wonder. But the mere fact that individuals can have
these experiences is not in and of itself the sole explanation for the parks’
publicness. Their publicness is intimately bound up with the identity of the
nation as a whole. The historical records bear this out. It is therefore worth
pausing to examine how the publicness of the parks affords benefits both to
individuals and to the community or collective, including the nation.75
Carol Rose has identified two features of property that lead to a
presumption of “publicness” rather than private ownership of specific
categories of property: the holdout problem and the notion that property is
more valuable when more people in a community use it.76 Each of these
rationales arguably applies to the national parks. The “holdout” problem is
the risk that a private owner could block access, charge fees to members of
Schindler, supra note 17, at 1101 (citations omitted).
See notes 111-112 and accompanying text (discussing Muir’s lament that only the wealthy
could afford access to natural wondrous spaces in the country). But see supra note 9 (discussing the
history of racial exclusion within national and state parks).
74 See supra notes 38 and 50 and accompanying text.
75 The notion of the parks’ benefits to the nation as a whole, and the relationship between
public lands and the creation of the nation are most notably associated with the words and actions
of President Theodore Roosevelt. See infra Section II.C.
76 Rose, supra note 13, at 761. Such properties include roadways, navigable waters, and beaches,
and their public nature has at times precluded efforts of individuals, but at times even of the
legislature, to dispose of or privatize them.
72
73
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the public, or otherwise prevent members of the public from using a property
that is needed for some public purpose.77 Thus, the anti-holdout rationale for
designating property as public applies when the property is “physically
capable of monopolization by private persons.”78 A classic example would be
when the government seeks to build a road, and sets about purchasing
individual lots needed for the best route. One holdout along the route could
stymie the whole project. Accordingly, the holdout problem has been offered
as a rationale for the government’s power of eminent domain to take private
property for public use.79 The holdout problem is consistent with the twin
concerns about exclusion and destruction and would certainly apply both to
individuals and to the community more broadly. While Rose describes the
holdout problem as a necessary condition for publicness, she nonetheless
regards it as insufficient on its own.
The second characteristic necessary for publicness is also significant in the
context of the national parks. That condition is the fact that “a property will
be more valuable if open to public access than it would be under exclusive
private control” because the more people that use it, the more enjoyment is
generated.80 For example, English custom allowed communities to hold
maypole dances on private property over a landowner’s objection. On this
custom Rose observed: “Activities of this sort may have value precisely
because they reinforce the solidarity and fellow-feeling of the whole community; thus
the more members of the community who participate, even if only as
observers, the better for all.”81
Rose refers to these activities that require lands to be public as a “comedy
of the commons” rather than a “tragedy of the commons.”82 The oft-described
tragedy of the commons involves a situation in which increased use by
individuals without some form of governance leads to depletion of a resource,
the classic example being open grazing land.83 In contrast, in a comedy of the
commons, public use of land generates greater enjoyment when more
members of the community participate; in Rose’s words, “the more the
merrier.”84 Only such broad community participation can generate solidarity
Id.
Id. at 762, 774.
Id. at 749-50, 761.
Id. at 761, 774 (noting that Calabresi and Melamed observed that “use of eminent domain to
overcome holdout presumes that property taken is more valuable for governmental purpose than in
hands of former owners” (citing Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-07 (1972))).
81 Rose, supra note 13, at 767-68 (emphasis added).
82 Id. at 768. In economic terms, Rose refers to these as “scale returns—greater value with greater
participation.” Id; see also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
83 See generally Hardin, supra note 82.
84 Rose, supra note 13, at 767-68.
77
78
79
80
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and “fellow-feeling.”85 Rose uses this insight to explain why doctrines about
“inherent publicness” applied to channels of commerce like roads and
waterways, which were needed because “commerce requires the interaction of
persons.”86 But property necessary for commerce is not the only context in
which this need for solidarity and fellow-feeling arises. As Rose notes, this
second characteristic may be especially true of “unique” properties87—a
category into which national parks would certainly fit in light of their unique
aesthetic beauty.88
Other scholars have similarly identified the collective value of public
goods in the context of public lands. For example, Joseph Sax refers to the
concept of a “bandwagon effect” in which “the value of something to any
given individual is itself dependent on whether it has value to others.”89 Eric
Orts and Amy Sepinwall seek to distinguish “collective goods” from the more
well-known economic concept of public goods,90 in which shared enjoyment
of collective resources warrants a different analysis than the ordinary
normative arguments for and against commodification of individual resources.91
To apply these normative frameworks to the national parks, in one
important sense, it is their open access to all—their collectiveness—that
reinforces their value to the nation. This publicness expresses something—it
speaks of a nation’s commitment to certain values.92 According to Sax,

85 Id. President Theodore Roosevelt, who played a crucial role in setting aside millions of acres
of public lands in the early twentieth century, spoke of the creation of “fellow-feeling” to describe
why public lands are needed. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, Fellow-Feeling as a Political Factor,
CENTURY, Jan. 1900, reprinted in THE STRENUOUS LIFE 65, 71 (1902) (“[T]he fact remains that the
only true solution of our political and social problems lies in cultivating everywhere the spirit of
brotherhood, of fellow-feeling, and understanding between man and man, and the willingness to
treat a man as a man, which are the essential factors in American democracy as we still see it in the
country districts.”).
86 Rose, supra note 13, at 770 (“In an odd Lockeanism, the public deserved access to these
properties, because ‘publicness,’ nonexclusive open access, created their highest value.”) (emphasis
in original).
87 Id. at 761.
88 Id. at 774.
89 See Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. U. L. REV. 481,
486 (1983) (“Some of the value of such things doubtless lies in their capacity to stimulate feelings
of national identity or cultural solidarity, and their value to any individual rises as they are embraced
by the entire community as public values.”).
90 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387,
387-89 (1954) (identifying that public goods are non-excludable and non-rivalrous).
91 See Eric W. Orts & Amy J. Sepinwall, Collective Goods and the Court: A Theory of Constitutional
Commodification, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 637, 639 (2020) (“Collective goods cannot be bought or sold
without destroying their essential nature. For example, to divide a national park such as Yosemite
into parcels of real estate would destroy its value as a collective good meant for the enjoyment of all
citizens in perpetuity.”).
92 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1995).
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wilderness has this quality.93 While an individual hiker derives value from
visiting wild public lands personally, that hiker “may also derive some benefits
from wilderness or historic preservation in some remote areas [they] will
never use or see, arising from the commitment of Americans to preserve wilderness
as a community value.”94 To put it succinctly:
A commitment to wilderness (or to symbols of America’s historic greatness)
yields such value to any given individual only if the community as a whole
treats it as important. And in such cases the evidence of such value is an act
of commitment by the whole community, such as embracing the national
policy of historic preservation, wilderness, the flag or any of a host of symbols
of national character or identity.95

Indeed, economists have demonstrated that people benefit merely from
knowing that such beautiful natural places exist, even if they do not use them.96
When we speak of the value of publicness of the parks therefore, it is
essential to speak not only of benefits to individuals, but also to the broader
community and nation as a whole. Designation of these spaces as public
expresses the nation’s commitment to the ideas that public lands must be
preserved from certain forms of private economic activity. It likewise
expresses the commitment that individuals of all means are entitled to share
in experiencing the bounties of the nation’s beauty without needing to seek
permission from wealthy individuals or corporations that could afford to set
aside such lands without government intervention.
In a related context, the Supreme Court has observed that maintenance
of national monuments at public expense is an essential element that facilitates
their appreciation by ordinary citizens.97 In the case of United States v.
Gettysburg Electric Railroad Company, the Supreme Court was called upon to
determine the legitimacy of an act of Congress that condemned land to create
memorials at the Gettysburg battlefield site, including whether the taking
was for a “public purpose.”98 In upholding the act of Congress over the
objection of a railroad whose land was taken for that purpose, the court wrote:
“Here upon this battlefield is one of the proofs of that expenditure, and the
Sax, supra note 89, at 486-87.
Id. at 486.
Id.
Carolyn Kousky & Sarah E. Light, Insuring Nature, 69 DUKE L.J. 323, 325 (2019). Such value
is referred to as “non-use value.” Id. at 334 (defining non-use values to include the “value of
preserving an ecosystem as part of a community’s cultural heritage, or the value that people derive
simply from knowing that a particular species continues to exist”).
97 United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 682-83 (1896); see also Rose, supra note
13, at 777 & n.309 (citing Gettysburg Electric Railroad on this point).
98 Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. at 669-71, 678.
93
94
95
96
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sacrifices are rendered more obvious and more easily appreciated when such
a battlefield is preserved by the government at the public expense.”99
In other words, a commemoration at Gettysburg would not have been as
meaningful if a private wealthy individual or corporation purchased the land
at market value, conducted surveys to understand the history of the battle,
and erected monuments to remember the acts that occurred on the battlefield.
The commitment of public resources expresses the fact that what is being set
aside is something of value to the nation as a whole. For the national parks,
such public commitments have borne fruit in the American consciousness.
The national parks have been referred to as America’s “best idea”100 and are a
source of national pride and public goodwill for the nation as a whole.
B. Protecting the Public from the Private
With this normative account in mind, it is now worth revisiting the story
of the creation of the national parks to focus on the specific ways in which the
founders of the parks sought to separate public from private. Going back in
time to before the consolidation of the parks under the NPS in 1916 more
fully reveals early concerns about the role of private commercial enterprise
and the role these concerns played in the setting aside of public lands to create
these parks.
Congress and the states had begun to designate discrete tracts of land
across the United States for public use and recreation beginning in the early
nineteenth century. In 1832, Congress enacted legislation designating Hot
Springs Reservation (now Hot Springs National Park) as public land to be
“reserved for the future disposal of the United States.”101 The legislation
declared that the land “shall not be entered, located, or appropriated, for any
other purpose whatever.”102 While this was the first federal reservation of land
along these lines, Congress only officially designated Hot Springs as a

99 Id. at 682-83.
100 See Famous Quotes

Concerning the National Parks, NAT’L PARK SERV. (last updated Jan. 16,
2003, 10:52 PM), https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/hisnps/NPSThinking/famousquotes.htm
[https://perma.cc/Z44E-6ULE] (“National parks are the best idea we ever had. Absolutely
American, absolutely democratic, they reflect us at our best rather than our worst.” (quoting Wallace
Stegner, 1983)).
101 Act of April 20, 1832, ch. 70, 4 Stat. 505. See generally Hot Springs National Park: History &
Culture, NAT’L PARK SERV. (last updated Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nps.gov/hosp/
learn/historyculture/index.htm [https://perma.cc/7M44-BRE5]; Sharon Shugart, Hot Springs
National Park: A Brief History of the Park, NAT’L PARK SERV. HIST. ELIBRARY (Nov. 2003),
http://www.npshistory.com/publications/hosp/bathhouse-row-brief-history.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V6C9-QHL2].
102 4 Stat. at 505.
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National Park in 1921, several years after the creation of the National
Park System.103
The origin story continues in California. In 1864, Congress deeded
specific tracts of land in the Yosemite Valley—which ultimately became part
of Yosemite National Park—to the State of California to be managed as a
public trust.104 Yosemite’s origin informs today’s debates over the appropriate
dividing line between public and private in the parks and thus warrants
detailed discussion. The 1864 grant to California explicitly underscored the
park’s purpose stating that the State “shall accept this grant upon the express
condition that the premises shall be held for public use, resort, and recreation;
shall be inalienable for all time; but leases not exceeding ten years may be
granted for portions of said premises.”105 The park was unquestionably being
set aside for a public purpose. However, this public purpose was deemed
compatible with the notion of private, short-term leases of the land.106
Landscape architect Frederick Law Olmstead served as one of the first
appointed Commissioners of the land grant within Yosemite Valley and the
Mariposa Big Tree Grove.107 In that capacity, Olmstead wrote Yosemite Valley
and the Mariposa Big Trees.108 He described the natural beauty of the scenery,
concluding, “[i]t is the will of the nation as embodied in the act of Congress
that this scenery shall never be private property, but that like certain
defensive points upon our coast it shall be held solely for public purposes.”109
He articulated a rationale for preserving nature in public trust:
[T]he occasional contemplation of natural scenes of an impressive character,
particularly if this contemplation occurs in connection with relief from
ordinary cares, change of air and change of habits, is favorable to the health
and vigor of men and especially to the health and vigor of their intellect
beyond any other conditions which can be offered them, that it not only gives

Act of Mar. 4, 1921, ch. 161, § 1, 41 Stat. 1367, 1407 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 361).
See Nagle, supra note 30, at 867 & n.18 (2015) (discussing controversy over claims to being
the “first” national park); Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 184, 13 Stat. 325.
105 § 1, 13 Stat. at 325.
106 See infra Part II.C.
107 Draft of Preliminary Report upon the Yosemite and Big Tree Grove; Typed Transcription of Draft
of Preliminary Report upon the Yosemite and Big Tree Grove; and Typed Transcription of Letter on the Great
American Park of the Yosemite, LIBR. OF CONG.: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSERVATION
MOVEMENT,
1850-1920,
https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/AMALL:@field
(NUMBER+@band(amrvm+vm02)) [https://perma.cc/QM9M-9LDH].
108 Robert Melnick, Yosemite National Park, SOC’Y OF ARCHITECTURAL HISTORIANS,
https://sah-archipedia.org/buildings/CA-01-043-8023 [https://perma.cc/E3KC-MU8A].
109 FREDRICK LAW OLMSTED, The Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa Big Tree Grove, in
AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM: THE CRITICAL DOCUMENTS 5, 9 (Lary M. Dilsaver ed.,
2nd ed. 2016).
103
104
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pleasure for the time being but increases the subsequent capacity for
happiness and the means of securing happiness.110

He lamented that only wealthy people had the means to enjoy the
“choicest natural scenes in the country and the means of recreation connected
with them.”111 In his view, public land should be available for those of ordinary
means.112 He argued that present enjoyment of these parks must be tempered
by “the rights of posterity” and a “duty of preservation” to future generations.113
Like Olmstead, but inspired by the Romantic notion of conservation,
Muir also valued these “spectacular” settings where “something entirely
different broke through in the mind” than in ordinary life.114 For Muir, the
virtue of publicness of the park was twofold: first, to provide spaces for all
people to interact with majesty and awe, which would bring them out of their
ordinary lives; and second, to provide this majesty to those who were of
average means and not wealthy, not merely to those who could afford access
to such lands independent of public commitments.
Olmstead and Muir were not alone expressing concerns about preserving
the land for public benefit against private encroachment. In 1871, J.D.
Whitney, the State Geologist of California, prepared The Yosemite Guidebook
at the direction of the Geological Survey of California for the primary
purpose of calling “the attention of the public to the scenery of California.”115
He lamented the efforts of two individuals to claim private ownership of land
within the Yosemite Valley, as well as efforts to pass bills (ultimately
unsuccessfully) in the state legislature on their behalf:
What the result will be, if ever such a bill passes, it is not difficult to predict.
The Yosemite Valley, instead of being held by the State for the benefit of the
people, and “for public use, resort, and pleasure,” as was solemnly promised,
will become the property of private individuals, and will be held and managed
for private benefit and not for the public good.116

Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 17. Olmstead, supra note 107.
Purdy, supra note 43, at 1148-49.
J.D. WHITNEY, THE YOSEMITE GUIDE-BOOK 9 (Univ. Press: Welch, Bigelow, & Co.,
Cambridge,
1871)
(1868),
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moa/ajl3519.0001.001?view=toc
[https://perma.cc/HBG5-BQYZ].
116 Id. at 19-20. These men included J.M. Hutchings, who was running a small hotel on the
claimed land, and James C. Lamon, who was residing on land he claimed was his. ISE, supra note 30,
at 54. Although the legislation did not pass, Hutchings received a lease to continue operating his
hotel and compensation, and the other claimant likewise received some compensation. Id. at 55.
110
111
112
113
114
115
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He expressed concern that the Yosemite Valley might become privately
developed like the areas around Niagara Falls in New York State, which even
by the 1860s had been privatized to the extent that “not a single point
remained in the United States from which the falls could be viewed without
paying a landowner an entry fee.”117 Granting these two private claims could,
in his view, lead to a slippery slope in which private parties could charge tolls
or fees to the public to view the natural scenery, diminishing the publicness
of the lands intended to be held in trust for the benefit of the people.118 He
further lamented that if these private claims were granted, it would be
impossible to deny subsequent private claims to this land that, in his view,
must remain “inalienable for all time.”119 Thus, again, these concerns
demonstrate a significant value of publicness as the prevention of exclusion
and the “holdout problem” that can arise when private property rights
encroach upon the public interest.
Despite these warnings, the Valley quickly became developed by
commercial interests:
Under lax state management, the Yosemite Valley emerged as a crazy quilt of
roads, hotels, and cabins, and pastures and pens for cattle, hogs, mules, and
horses. Tilled lands supplied food for residents and visitors, and feed for
livestock; irrigation dams and ditches supported agriculture; and timber
operations supplied wood for construction, fencing, and heating. Amid the
clutter of development stood one “luxury” hotel, the three-and-a-half-story
Stoneman House, built in 1886.120

By 1889, Muir became concerned about a different form of private action
that might degrade the Valley: namely, that the lands “surrounding Yosemite
Valley, which lacked government protection, were being overrun and
destroyed by domestic sheep grazing.”121 This need to make these surrounding
117 Joseph L. Sax, America’s National Parks: Their Principles, Purposes, and Prospects, NAT. HIST.,
Oct. 1976, at 57, 64; see also WHITNEY, supra note 115, at 20 (“As the tide of travel in the direction of
this wonderful and unique locality increases, so will the vexations, restraints, and annoying charges
. . . and the Yosemite Valley, instead of being a ‘joy forever,’ will become, like Niagara Falls, a gigantic
institution for fleecing the public.”); Doremus, supra note 37, at 439 (referring to the Falls as “the
epitome of crass commercialization”).
118 WHITNEY, supra note 115, at 20. This would later come to be referred to as a “holdout”
problem, which is a reason to maintain property in public or government hands. See Rose, supra note
13, at 749-51 (discussing the anti-holdout rationale for public or government ownership or
management of property in multiple contexts).
119 Id. at 21.
120 SELLARS, supra note 30, at 18. See also ISE, supra note 30, at 71-73, 76-83.
121 Yosemite
National Park Established, HISTORY: THIS DAY IN HISTORY,
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/yosemite-national-park-established [https://perma.cc
/CNG3-PEYA]. What is now Yosemite National Park consists of “two parts . . . the Valley, which
was ceded to the state of California in 1864, and the high Sierra country surrounding the Valley,
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lands public was acute because of the twin concerns of destruction and
commodification—overgrazing of public lands could destroy them, as in the
classic tragedy of the commons.122
Muir enlisted the assistance of Robert Underwood Johnson, an
“environmentalist and influential magazine editor,” and together they lobbied
Congress to protect the areas surrounding the Valley by designating them as
protected park lands by the United States.123 On October 1, 1890, Congress did
so, declaring that more than 1,500 square miles of land should be set aside;
ultimately these lands became part of the consolidated Yosemite National Park.124
After campaigns by the Sierra Club and Muir, among others, to press for
recession of Yosemite Valley to the federal government, in 1905, the State of
California enacted legislation granting back to the United States the
protected land within the Yosemite Valley and Mariposa Big Tree Grove
parks and the trusts created by Congress to be maintained “as a national
park.”125 In 1906, the United States accepted the recession of the land from
the state and appropriated funds from the Treasury for the “management,
protection and improvement of the Yosemite National Park.”126 In 1912,
Congress adopted an Act to acquire title to “any or all of the lands held in
private ownership within the boundaries” of Yosemite National Park, offering
in exchange certain “decayed or matured timber” that could easily be removed
without otherwise impairing the “scenic beauty” of the park.127
Although Congress set aside the land within the Yosemite Valley as a
public trust managed by the State of California in 1864, the title of first
national park created as such belongs to Yellowstone National Park.128 Early
which was set aside as ‘reserved forest lands’ in 1890, a doughnut-shaped park, to which the Central
Valley was added in 1906.” ISE, supra note 30, at 51; cf. id. at 55 (noting that the name “Yosemite”
does not appear in the 1890 Act, and that Congress originally considered the reservation to be one
of forest land). The 1890 Act “created a rather peculiar situation—a national park surrounding a
neglected and abused state park—and this situation persisted for sixteen years, until 1906.” Id. at 58.
122 On the tragedy of the commons, see Hardin, supra note 82.
123 Yosemite National Park Established, supra note 121.
124 Id.
125 Yosemite-Regranting to United States, ch. 60, 1905 Cal. Stat. 54. The state had had
difficulty managing the land and protecting the wildlife. ISE, supra note 30, at 58-59 (discussing
overgrazing, destruction of land, and loss of wildlife within the state park); id. at 74 (discussing
recession of the park to the United States).
126 S.J. Res. 30, 58th Cong., 33 Stat. 1286 (1905) (enacted). In 1893, it was estimated that
approximately 65,000 acres within the Park were the subject of private claims for homestead and
timber, among other claims, while that number was revised downward in 1898 to 53,931 acres. ISE,
supra note 30, at 65-66.
127 Act of Apr. 9, 1912, ch. 74, 37 Stat. 80, 80-81.
128 54 U.S.C. § 100101(b)(1)(a) (“[T]he National Park System began with the establishment of
Yellowstone National Park in 1872 . . . .”); see also Nagle, supra note 30, at 867; ISE, supra note 30, at
13 (“Yellowstone was really the first national park to be created, in 1872, although some do claim that
distinction for Yosemite.”).
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discussions highlight concerns about privatization and commodification of
the park’s precious resources. In 1872, Congress established a tract of land in
the Territories of Montana and Wyoming near the headwaters of the
Yellowstone River as “a public park or pleasuring-ground for the benefit and
enjoyment of the people.”129 In the House Report that accompanied the bill,
the Committee on Public Lands took pains to disclaim any potential for the
land to be inhabitable, or a source of commercial revenue through mining or
agriculture.130 The Committee highlighted the importance of protecting these
lands from those who would seek to profit from their natural beauty as
privateers had near Niagara Falls:
Persons are now waiting for the spring to open to enter in and take possession
of these remarkable curiosities, to make merchandise of these beautiful
specimens, to fence in these rare wonders so as to charge visitors a fee, as is
now done at Niagara Falls, for the sight of that which ought to be as free as
the air or water.131

One Senator spoke in favor of the bill, contending that if the land were
not set aside,
it is possible that some person may go there and plant himself right across
the only path that leads to these wonders, and charge every man that passes
along between the gorges of these mountains a fee of a dollar or five dollars.
He may place an obstruction there, and toll may be gathered from every
person who goes to see these wonders of creation.132

These concerns echo the holdout problem identified by Carol Rose, in
which private actors could prevent or increase the costs for members of the
public to appreciate nature’s splendor. The enacting legislation provided that
the Secretary of the Interior had authority to make necessary rules and
regulations to manage the land, to “provide for the preservation, from injury
or spoliation, of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders
within said park, and their retention in their natural condition.”133
These early discussions at the time of the establishment of the parks
surfaced a number of specific concerns that private or commercial interests
Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32, 32.
H.R. Rep. No. 42-26, at 1-2 (1872). The Committee further noted, “[i]f this bill fails to
become a law . . . the vandals who are now waiting to enter into this wonderland will, in a single
season, despoil, beyond recovery, these remarkable curiosities which have required all the cunning
skill of nature thousands of years to prepare.” Id. at 2.
131 Id. at 1. For other discussions of commercialization at Niagara Falls, see RUNTE, supra note
30, at 5-7.
132 ISE, supra note 30, at 16-17 (quoting Trumbull, CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, Jan. 30, 1872, at
697).
133 Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, § 2, 17 Stat. 32, 33.
129
130
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would (1) strip the land of its natural assets to sell them in private markets
(destruction and commodification); (2) lay claims to private ownership of
these wonders, and prevent members of the public from viewing them
(exclusion); (3) otherwise limit the ability of the public to enjoy these
aesthetic experiences by charging fees to view or enter these lands (exclusion
and commodification); or (4) destroy the natural wonders through overuse,
including through activities like grazing (destruction). In some sense, these
concerns reflect the view that no private interest should be allowed to
monopolize or exclude members of the public from enjoying their natural
rights to these wonders, nor should their physical actions (removal or
destruction of nature) prevent anyone from enjoying them in the present or
the future. 134 The virtues of publicness of the parks are those that stand as
foils to these concerns.
The creation of national parks was not merely the creation of parks; it was
the creation of national parks. Between 1872 when Congress designated
Yellowstone National Park, and 1916 when Congress ultimately passed the
Organic Act, Congress created fourteen national parks by statute, providing
similar language that these public lands were for the “benefit and enjoyment
of the people.”135 Within this time period came the presidency of Theodore
Roosevelt, the President most widely associated with the conservation
movement, who set aside more than 230 million acres of public lands as

134 On the right to exclude, see sources cited supra note 13. On the right to destroy, see
Strahilevitz, supra note 14.
135 Act of Aug. 9, 1916, ch. 302, § 1, 39 Stat. 442, 442-43 (establishing Lassen Volcanic National
Park); Act of Aug. 1, 1916, ch. 264, § 1, 39 Stat. 432, 432 (establishing Hawaii National Park); Act of
Jan. 26, 1915, ch. 19, § 1, 38 Stat. 798, 798-800 (establishing Rocky Mountain National Park); Act of
May 11, 1910, ch. 226, § 1, 36 Stat. 354, 354 (establishing Glacier National Park); Act of May 22, 1902,
ch. 820, § 1, 32 Stat. 202, 202 (establishing Crater Lake National Park); Act of Mar. 2, 1899, ch. 377,
§ 1, 30 Stat. 993, 993-94 (establishing Mount Rainier National Park); Act of Sept. 25, 1890, ch. 926,
§ 1, 26 Stat. 478, 478 (establishing Sequoia National Park, later King’s Canyon); Act of Oct. 1, 1890,
ch. 1262, 26 Stat. 650, 650-51 (establishing Yosemite National Park); Act of Jan. 9, 1903, ch. 63, 32
Stat. 765, 765-66 (establishing Wind Cave National Park); Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3607, 34 Stat.
615, 616-617 (establishing Mesa Verde National Park). See generally Nagle, supra note 30, at 867 &
n.19 (listing these enactments and also noting that “[t]hree other early national parks are no longer
national parks” including Sully’s Hill National Park, Platt National Park in Oklahoma, and Mackinac
Island National Park) (citing JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, LAW’S ENVIRONMENT: HOW THE LAW
SHAPES THE PLACES WE LIVE 102-03 (2010)). In 1970 and 1978, Congress adopted the National
Park System General Authorities Act and the Redwoods Act, respectively, to update the 1916
Organic Act. National Park system General Authorities Act, Pub. L. No. 91-383, § 1, 84 Stat. 825,
825 (1970) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § la-I (1994) (current version at 54 U.S.C 100101(b));
Redwoods Act, Pub. L. No. 95-250, § 101(b), 92 Stat. 163, 166 (1978) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § la-1 (1994) (current version at 54 U.S.C 100101(b)). These two statutes reaffirmed that all
of the national parks, regardless of the fact that they were established with different statutes, are
“united through their inter-related purposes and resources” into a single system and are to be held
to the same legal standards under the Organic Act. Nagle, supra note 30, at 871 & nn.36-37.
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national parks, national monuments, and forests during his time in office.136
Roosevelt repeatedly spoke of his goal of civic nation-building. In his
speeches to the nation, Roosevelt emphasized the importance of elevating
“‘the public interest’ as distinct from individual, class, or sectional
interests.”137 According to Jed Purdy, Roosevelt’s “‘new nationalism’ . . .
treated conservation as both a master-metaphor for wise governance and as a
source of concrete policies for civic improvement.”138
Public lands served this new nationalism, according to Roosevelt, in at
least three ways.139 The first was the most abstract but arguably the deepest:
the setting aside by government of public lands (including, but not limited to
the national parks) was a public statement of common purpose “transcending
faction” which could “unite a divided polity.”140 This was consistent with
Roosevelt’s strong anti-monopolist views, such as his statement that “natural
resources must be used for the benefit of all of our people, and not
monopolized for the benefit of the few.”141 Second, Roosevelt viewed public
lands as a form of “civic commons” where Americans from different walks of
life could interact, and thus escape factionalism according to class.142
Roosevelt’s words about the national forests could apply with equal force to
the parks: they could offer “free camping grounds for the ever-increasing
numbers of men and women who have learned to find rest, health, and
recreation in the splendid forests and flower-clad meadows of our

136 Theodore Roosevelt and Conservation, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov
/thro/learn/historyculture/theodore-roosevelt-and-conservation.htm
[https://perma.cc/W6L579WA] (last updated Nov. 16, 2017). Like John Muir, President Roosevelt’s legacy with respect to
inclusion and race is not unblemished. Robin Pogrebin, Roosevelt Statute To Be Removed From Museum
of Natural History, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/21/arts/design/roosevelt-statue-to-be-removed-from-museum-of-natural-history.html
[https://perma.cc/R8WT-EE9Q] (discussing the museum’s removal of Roosevelt’s statute as it was
marred by racist imagery and his support of the eugenics movement, but noting the renaming of a
Hall within the Museum to recognize his “conservation legacy”).
137 Purdy, supra note 433, at 1152.
138 Id. at 1156 & nn. 109-15; see also Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life, Speech before the
Hamilton Club (Apr. 10, 1899), reprinted in THE STRENUOUS LIFE: ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 1 (1902).
139 Purdy, supra note 43, at 1156-59.
140 Id. at 1157.
141 Id. (quoting THEODORE ROOSEVELT, The New Nationalism, Speech at Osawatomie (Aug.
31, 1910), reprinted in THE NEW NATIONALISM 21 (1910)). Roosevelt identified with the
conservationist approach to public lands: “Conservation means development as much as it does
protection.” ROOSEVELT, supra. But conservation did not “recognize the right to waste [natural
resources], or to rob, by wasteful use, the generations that come after us.” Id.
142 Purdy, supra note 43, at 1157-58, 1158 nn. 120-21; ROOSEVELT, supra note 85, at 71 (“[T]he
fact remains that the only true solution of our political and social problems lies in cultivating
everywhere the spirit of brotherhood, of fellow-feeling and understanding between man and man,
and the willingness to treat a man as a man, which are the essential factors in American democracy
as we still see it in the country districts.”).
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mountains.”143 Again, the goal was to create a nation that would transcend
factional interests. Third, the national parks and other public lands would
promote the development of “vigorous character” including what Purdy
refers to as the “masculine virtues” that come from “natural outdoor play.”144
This purpose did not necessarily relate to avoiding factionalism (and was
clearly restricted at the time to boys). However, it undoubtedly promoted
“civic virtue” which the state has an obligation to promote on behalf of its
citizens. Thus, the publicness of the parks is necessary, at least in significant
part, to create the idea of the nation of the United States. The parks stand as
an expression of the nation’s values.
President Roosevelt identified how the interests of “the few” might
“sacrifice[e] the future of the Nation as a whole to their own self-interest of
the moment.”145 Although speaking of national forests rather than the parks,
he clearly identified public forest lands with the Nation itself: “These lands,
because they form a National asset, are as emphatically national as the rivers
which they feed, and which flow through so many States before they reach
the ocean.”146 Thus, public lands—which include but are not limited to the
national parks—do not merely provide a space for individuals to experience
wonder and awe, or quiet contemplation away from the routines of ordinary
life. They both build and constitute the nation itself. This nation-building
role could overcome the narrow concerns of factions and private interests.
Despite these concerns in early years about dominant or monopolistic
commercial enterprise and private factions destroying these public virtues, at
least some forms of commercial enterprise, like private hotel
accommodations, were expressly incorporated in the acts establishing the
parks. In other words, not all private commercial enterprise was originally
seen as incompatible with the idea of creating national parks for the benefit
of the public. The next section demonstrates this ambivalence.
C. A Role for Private Enterprise—But Not Too Much
While setting aside these lands for public benefit, Congress recognized
that accommodations were required in order to bring visitors to the parks.
Only if members of the public visited the parks would constituencies develop
to support their continued operation and the creation of more parks.
Theodore Roosevelt, President of U.S., State of the Union Address (Dec. 3, 1901), in STATE
UNION ADDRESSES OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT (2004) (ebook)
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5032/5032-h/5032-h.htm#dec1901 [https://perma.cc/SEH9-6WX3].
144 Purdy, supra note 43, at 1158-59.
145 Theodore Roosevelt, President of U.S., State of the Union Address (Dec. 3, 1907), in STATE
OF THE UNION ADDRESSES OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 143.
146 Id.
143
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Accordingly, many of the individual statutes creating national parks, as well
as the 1916 Organic Act itself, permitted the leasing of land to private third
parties to erect accommodations for visitors.147 Congress could have directed
the Department of the Interior to create such accommodations under
government ownership and control. However, it did not. Thus, from their
inception, the national parks—these emblems of publicness—acknowledged
some role for private enterprise.
1. The Early Years
In the Yosemite Valley and what ultimately became Yosemite National
Park, small hotel accommodations were constructed beginning in 1855.148
Beginning in 1878, privately run campgrounds were also being developed in
the park.149 In 1889, the Curry family, whose interests later were consolidated
into the Yosemite Park & Curry Company,150 developed privately run
campsites and other services for visitors.151 They established entertainment
traditions for park visitors like the popular “firefall” attraction, which
involved pushing burning embers over Glacier Point and creating a visible
cascade of fire after dark.152 The Curry family was so successful that they
achieved “practical monopoly” status over tourist facilities in Yosemite by the
time they merged with another entity to form the Yosemite Park & Curry
Company.153
In 1872, the legislation that established Yellowstone National Park also
provided expressly for the Secretary of the Interior to enter into leases of up
to ten years for “small parcels of ground, at such places in said park as shall
147 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, § 2 17 Stat. 32, 33 (authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to lease “small parcels of ground” for up to ten years, and to use any revenue collected to
provide for management of the park and the “construction of roads and bridle-paths therein” in
Yellowstone); Act of Apr. 20, 1832, ch. 70, § 2 4 Stat. at Large 505, 505 (authorizing the governor in
the Territory of Arkansas to “let out or lease said springs” for up to a five-year term, with the rents
and profits being applied “to the opening and improving” of roads in the Territory). Similar
language appears in the other enacting statutes. See Nagle, supra note 30, at 868 & n.20 (citing
similar language in establishment acts of Lassen Volcanic National Park, Hawaii National Park,
Glacier National Park, Mount Rainier National Park, Wind Cave National Park, Crater Lake
National Park, and Sequoia National Park).
148 See ISE, supra note 30, at 80-81 (describing the Lower Hotel, Black’s, the Upper Hotel, and
the Hutchings Hotel, among others).
149 Id. at 81.
150 Frank Clifford, Curry Co. Turns over Yosemite Concessions, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 1993, 12:00
AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-10-02-mn-41470-story.html [https://perma.cc
/8LP9-PH86]; Yosemite Park & Curry Company Collection, ONLINE ARCHIVE OF CAL.,
https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c8n302f3/ [https://perma.cc/4HZL-2B8H].
151 ISE, supra note 30, at 82.
152 Id.
153 Id.
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require the erection of buildings for the accommodation of visitors” with “all
of the proceeds” from these leases going to fund the construction of roads
and bridle paths” within the park.154 As a result of the short lease terms, in
the early years, many private entrepreneurs opted to seek leases for “camps
and transportation facilities” rather than for hotels, as these movable assets
could be “taken out of the park” if a lease was not renewed.155 Even before
1872, several accommodations had been built in the area, even though the
owners lacked “right or title,” to the land.156
This role for private enterprise was limited by statute, however. In 1883
and 1894, in response to concerns that had arisen in the parks about the
creation of a quasi-monopoly in a private concession agreement,157 Congress
more narrowly defined the potential lease terms by setting maximum acreage
limits, prohibiting the leasing of natural “objects of curiosity or interest” like
the geysers themselves, and prohibiting the exclusion of members of the
public from free access to these natural wonders.158
Some of the most prominent business firms of their day—the railroads—
were also early supporters of and beneficiaries of the parks. In 1883, the
Northern Pacific Railroad entered into a lease agreement with the Interior
Department, having recognized the benefit to its railroad business of having
a wondrous place to visit at a “reasonable” price.159 Other concessioners
developed permanent tent campgrounds with other services, and by 1910, $1

154 Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, § 2, 17 Stat. 17, 32, 33. There was a widespread belief at the time
that the park would be “self-supporting, that concessioners would pay as rents enough to provide for
administration and protection” of the park and that thus, Congressional appropriations would not
be necessary. However, this turned out not to be the case. ISE, supra note 30, at 20. Beginning in
1878, Congress appropriated some funds for the “protection, preservation and improvement of
Yellowstone Park.” Id. at 29.
155 ISE, supra note 30, at 32. The length of the contract term matters a great deal for the
question of investment in immovable facilities. Id. at 612-13. Too short a term will discourage the
construction of facilities with a long lifespan, as the amortization period is too short. In addition,
short-term leases raise questions over how to compensate the concessioner if the concession contract
is not renewed and some other entity is allowed to use the facilities under a new contract. Id.
156 Id. at 33.
157 See id. at 35-39 (discussing the cancelled Hobart-Douglas-Hatch quasi-monopoly lease, and
the acts of 1883 and 1894 that defined the terms of leases for hotel accommodations).
158 Id. at 39.
159 Id.; see also Modernizing the National Park Service Concession Program: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Interior of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 6 (2015) (statement
of Lena McDowall, Chief Fin. Officer, Nat’l Park Serv., Dep’t of the Interior) (“Concessions in our
national parks predate the formation of the National Park Service. Most of the large concessions
operations in our Western parks were begun in the late 1800s by the large railroads or companies
looking to serve the growing demands of travelers from the eastern United States.”). In 1906,
Congress further amended the law to permit concessioners to lease up to 200 acres of land, and to
place mortgages on their properties. ISE, supra note 30, at 39.
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million had been invested in Yellowstone. By 1912, concessioners had earned
$1 million in profits.160
2. The Organic Act
When Congress established the National Park System in 1916, Director
Stephen Mather largely sought to consolidate private concessions into a
“regulated monopoly.”161 The Organic Act recognized that accommodations
and other infrastructure would be needed to bring members of the public to
enjoy and use the parks. However, these leases and permits to operate
accommodations were limited in time and in other ways to ensure that the
public would always have free access to the parks. The Act therefore
authorized the Director of the NPS to
grant privileges, leases, and permits for the use of land for the
accommodation of visitors in the various parks, monuments, or other
reservations herein provided for, but for periods not exceeding twenty years;
and no natural curiosities, wonders, or objects of interest shall be leased,
rented, or granted to anyone on such terms as to interfere with free access to
them by the public . . . .162

In the absence of adequate accommodations, it would be less likely that
people would visit the parks, and visitors were desirable as they would create
a natural constituency for the parks over time.163 This authority was limited
only by the term limit and by the proviso that “no natural curiosities, wonders,
or objects of interest shall be leased, rented, or granted to anyone on such
terms as to interfere with free access to them by the public.”164
As John Ise points out in his history of the national parks, Congress could
have opted for a different mix of public and private for the construction and
operation of accommodations.165 Ise concludes that because Congress failed
to appropriate any money for construction and operation of facilities, in the
early years, private construction was often the only option.166 Early
experiences in the parks demonstrated that in the absence of regulated
ISE, supra note 30, at 40.
Id. at 82. In fact, while private enterprise was the norm, there were some government
owned-and-operated accommodations in Yosemite, the Petrified Forest, and at Mount McKinley
(now Denali), among others. Id. at 614.
162 Act of Aug. 25, 1916, ch. 408 § 3, 39 Stat. 535, 535. In 1958, Congress raised this to a
maximum of 30 years. Act of May 29, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-434, 72 Stat. 152 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 3) (repealed and recodified as amended at 54 U.S.C. § 102101).
163 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
164 § 3, 39 Stat. at 535.
165 ISE, supra note 30, at 606.
166 Id.
160
161
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monopolies, competing concessioners sought to provide everything from
transportation to lodging, but were unable to provide “reliable” service. 167 In
contrast to those early years, Ise noted that there is now a great deal of
competition between services provided inside the parks and those provided
outside park boundaries by a more competitive market, especially now that
cars allow people to travel easily across the boundary line.168
Other forms of private enterprise have long existed within federal public
lands, including the national parks, and have raised similar concerns regarding
the appropriate balance between use and preservation. As Bruce Huber has
pointed out, private claims to public lands include grazing rights, privately
owned cabins, and mineral rights, among others.169 Some of these private
claims are held by individuals, and others are held by business firms. Huber
demonstrated that such private claims to public lands have been surprisingly
durable, even claims that potentially interfere with public access or that are
consumptive, like grazing.170 The forms of private activity that Huber focused
on in his study fall into these areas of traditional concern. For example, some
of these private claims are extractive and commodify the land: grazing and
mining both remove something from the land, in some cases in exchange for
a fee. Some of these forms of privatization can lead to the exclusion of the
public. For example, building a private cabin on public land precludes
members of the public from accessing or using the space.
This narrative demonstrates that while early advocates and creators of
these parks feared encroachment of private enterprise, they nonetheless had
to accommodate some private enterprise within the parks. Even in the earliest
years, it was clear that limits needed to be set to ensure that what was meant
for the use and enjoyment of the public would not be transformed into private
property with members of the public excluded from the parks’ use and
enjoyment.
There are, in addition to concessions, other private corporate actions that
do not harm or extract anything from the parks, nor do they exclude members
of the public from their use. Rather, they embody a different form of
commercial benefit—commercial benefit through association with the
national parks’ goodwill. It is to building out the contours of this
phenomenon that the Article now turns.

167 Id. at 607-08. Other concerns, for example, that tourists could not in their short visits
properly inform themselves regarding the differences between two firms providing services, id. at
608, are likely unfounded in the internet era.
168 Id. at 608-09.
169 Huber, supra note 7.
170 Id. at 1002, 1005, 1017.
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III. NON-EXTRACTIVE CORPORATE ACTIVITY WITHIN THE PARKS
This Part is both descriptive and analytical. To add to the historical case
study of concessions in the last Part, it offers two more recent examples that
are shades of the same phenomenon—non-extractive corporate activities
within the national parks that impose no physical harm and do not exclude
members of the public, yet nonetheless raise objections regarding the
appropriate line between public and private. These are corporate
concessioners’ attempts to own trademarks to significant attractions within
the parks and corporate philanthropy/cause-related marketing. The next Part
will then take a deep dive into the normative questions regarding the benefits
to business firms of these relationships and the potential impact—including
both benefits and harms—on the parks.
A. A Hotel by Any Other Name: Ownership of Intangible Property
It is worth focusing on a controversy in which non-extractive corporate
action within the parks nonetheless raised serious concerns about the
appropriate boundary between public and private. That controversy is a
recently settled dispute over who owned the trademarks to the names of
historic landmarked properties within Yosemite National Park. Unlike the
concerns about privatization a century ago, in this case, the private
concessioner did not claim ownership to any natural wonders, or even to the
hotels it operated. Such claims, if validated, would have raised the concerns
that were at the forefront of the early park supporters’ minds: the ability of
private actors to exclude members of the public or to raise fees and tolls to
make entry to the parks more expensive, the potential to physically harm the
parks, or the practice of removing and commodifying something within the
parks for sale in a market. Instead, a concessioner claimed ownership over
something intangible—the famous names of several historic hotels and
properties, as well as the name Yosemite National Park itself. These claims of
ownership over intangible property raised significant concerns about private
encroachment on the publicness of the parks.
On September 17, 2015, Plaintiff DNC Parks & Resorts at Yosemite, Inc.
(“Delaware North”) filed suit against the National Park Service (NPS),
seeking damages under the Tucker Act171 resulting from an alleged breach of
contract.172 The gravamen of Delaware North’s complaint related to the NPS’s

171 Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (waiving the United States Government’s sovereign immunity
with respect to certain claims).
172 Complaint ¶ 1, DNC Parks & Resorts at Yosemite, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:15-cv-01034PEC (Fed. Cl. dismissed Aug. 30, 2019) [hereinafter DNC Complaint]; First Amended Complaint
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conducting of a competitive bidding process for a new concession contract at
Yosemite. When the NPS ultimately awarded that contract to a new
concessioner, Aramark Hospitality (a subsidiary of the Aramark
Corporation), Delaware North alleged that the NPS failed to insist that
Aramark pay the full, fair market value of Delaware North’s intangible
property, including its intellectual property.173 According to Delaware North,
this intellectual property included trademarks it held in the names of several
historic landmarked properties within Yosemite, including the famed
Ahwahnee and Wawona hotels, as well as certain specific logos and designs
relating to sites within Yosemite.174
Delaware North had been awarded the concession contract with the NPS
in 1993. Previously, the contract had been held by the Yosemite Park & Curry
Co. (YP&CC), which held a near-monopoly on the concessions within
Yosemite National Park since the early 1900s. In 1991, MCA, the parent
company of the Yosemite Park & Curry Company, was acquired by the
Japanese firm Matsushita.175 No law expressly prohibited foreign ownership
of a concessioner in the national parks. However, the Department of the
Interior and the NPS, along with the National Park Foundation (NPF),
agreed that the NPF would enter into an agreement with MCA to purchase
100% of MCA’s stock in YP&CC for $49.5 million plus interest, to be paid
from revenues generated by concessions operations beginning in 1993.176
According to the Secretary of the Interior, the goal of the agreement was to
acquire and extinguish the possessory interest held by MCA/YP&CC, so that
there would be no preferential right of renewal of the concession contract and
new bidders could bid on an even playing field.177 In 1992, the NPS bid out
the contract to run the concession, including provisions in the request for
proposals that the successor concessioner would acquire all of YP&CC’s
stock.178 Delaware North won the contract. Relevant to this litigation, in 1988,
¶¶ 1-2, 13, 20, 25-33, DNC Parks & Resorts at Yosemite, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:15-cv-0-1034PEC (Fed. Cl. dismissed Aug. 30, 2019) [hereinafter DNC Amended Complaint].
173 DNC Complaint, supra note 172, ¶¶ 1, 19, 26.
174 DNC Amended Complaint, supra note 172, ¶¶ 13, 20, 25-33.
175 See Proposed Sale of the Yosemite Park & Curry Co.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands,
Nat’l Parks, and Forests of the Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 102d Cong. 7 (1991) (statement of Robert
D. Hadl, Vice President and Gen. Couns., MCA, Inc.).
176 Proposed Sale of the Yosemite Park & Curry Co.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands,
Nat’l Parks, and Forests of the Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 102d Cong. 4-5 (1991) (statement of
Hon. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior, Accompanied By James Ridenour, Dir., Nat’l
Park Serv.).
177 Proposed Sale of the Yosemite Park & Curry Co.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands,
Nat’l Parks, and Forests of the Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 102d Cong. 22 (1991) (statement of
Leonard L. Silverstein, Couns., Nat’l Park Found.).
178 Delaware North alleged in its complaint that it purchased not stock but the assets of the
YP&CC pursuant to contract CC-YOSE004-93. DNC Complaint, supra note 172, ¶¶ 5, 13.
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YP&CC had filed a trademark application for “The Ahwahnee,” and in 2003,
the USPTO registered that the trademark had been conveyed from YP&CC
to Delaware North.179
A brief explanation of the concession law that governed the contract is in
order to help understand Delaware North’s complaint. In 1965, Congress
adopted the National Park System Concessions Policy Act (Concessions
Policy Act), to modernize the relationship between concessioners and the
NPS.180 The Concessions Policy Act declared:
the preservation of park values requires that such public accommodations,
facilities, and services as have to be provided within those areas should be
provided only under carefully controlled safeguards against unregulated and
indiscriminate use, so that the heavy visitation will not unduly impair these
values and so that development of such facilities can best be limited to
locations where the least damage to park values will be caused.181

Thus any concessions were to be “limited to those that are necessary and
appropriate for public use and enjoyment” of the parks, and that are
“consistent to the highest practicable degree with the preservation and
conservation of the areas.”182
While declaring its intent to protect the parks against damage, Congress
nonetheless acknowledged the need for concessioners to “realize a profit on
[their] operation as a whole commensurate with the capital invested and the
obligations assumed.”183 Accordingly, the Concessions Policy Act of 1965 gave
significant privileges to concessioners. Principal among these privileges were
a preferential right of renewal and a possessory interest in improvements.184
179 Amended Answer to Plaintiff ’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 167, DNC Parks & Resorts at
Yosemite, Inc. v. United States of America, No. 15-cv-1034 (Fed. Cl. 2018) [hereinafter Amended
Answer to DNC Amended Complaint].
180 Act of Oct. 9, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-249, 79 Stat. 969, repealed by Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-391, § 415(a), 112 Stat. 3497, 3515 (1998).
181 Id. § 1, at 969. These sections were editorially transferred as a note under 54 U.S.C.
§ 101912, by Pub. L. No. 113-287, 128 Stat. 3094 (2014). Doremus, supra note 37, at 470 n.349.
182 § 1, 79 Stat. at 969.
183 Id. § 3, at 969. The Act stated that concessioners needed protection “against loss of
investment in structures, fixtures, improvements, equipment, supplies, and other tangible property
provided by him for the purposes of the contract.” Id.
184 Id. § 4, at 970. The Act permitted the Secretary to

authorize the operation of all accommodations, facilities, and services for visitors, or
of all such accommodations, facilities, and services of generally similar character, in
each area, or portion thereof [of a park] by one responsible concessioner and may grant
to such concessioner a preferential right to provide such new or additional
accommodations, facilities, or services as the Secretary may consider necessary or
desirable for the accommodation and convenience of the public.
Id.
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The purpose of the preferential right of renewal was to provide continuity of
service and to encourage long-term investment in the facilities by those
concessioners who satisfactorily performed their obligations under prior
contracts.185 If the Secretary chose to extend a contract, he was required to
“give reasonable public notice of his intention so to do” and to consider other
proposals, but the preference remained.186 In addition, the possessory interest
provisions made clear that if a concessioner “acquired or constructed . . . any
structure, fixture, or improvement” within a park, the concessioner gained a
“possessory interest therein, which shall consist of all incidents of ownership
except legal title,” which vested in the United States.187 This possessory
interest was so strong that it would “not be extinguished by the expiration or
other termination of the contract” and, if the improvement was “taken for
public use,” required the United States to pay “just compensation.”188
In reaction to criticisms that the 1965 Act gave too much power and profit
to concessioners, in 1998, Congress enacted the National Park Service
Concessions Management Improvement Act.189 In that Act, Congress
declared that
the preservation and conservation of System unit resources and values
requires that public accommodations, facilities, and services that have to be
provided within those System units should be provided only under carefully
controlled safeguards against unregulated and indiscriminate use, so that—
(1) visitation will not unduly impair those resources and values; and
(2) development of public accommodations, facilities, and services within
System units can best be limited to locations that are consistent to the highest
practicable degree with the preservation and conservation of the resources
and values of the System units.190

Congress further declared that accommodations “shall be limited” to those
that are “necessary and appropriate” for public use and enjoyment and that
are “consistent to the highest practicable degree with the preservation and
conservation of the resources and values” of the park.191

Id. § 5, at 970.
Id.
Id. § 6, at 970.
Id. The compensation would be in the amount determined by a formula set forth in the
Act. Id. at 970-71.
189 National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-391, 112 Stat. 3497
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 5901).
190 National Park Service Concessions Management Improvement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-391, § 402(a), 112 Stat. 3503, 3503 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 5951).
191 Id. § 402(b), at 3504.
185
186
187
188
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The 1998 Act, which remains in effect, expressly requires competitive
selection of contractors and requires public solicitation of proposals.192 The
Act prohibits the Secretary from granting a preferential right of renewal,193
except for very small outfitter and guide concession contracts resulting in
gross annual receipts of less than $500,000.194 The Act clarifies that a
preferential right of renewal in such cases means only that the existing
concessioner has the opportunity to “match the terms and conditions of any
competing proposal” that the Secretary has determined to be the “best
proposal” under criteria set forth in the statute.195 In addition, the NPS must
now publicly solicit proposals for concession contracts. It is required to select
the best proposal that meets the objectives of “protecting, conserving, and
preserving resources of the System unit” and providing appropriate facilities
at “reasonable rates,” taking into account the experience and financial
capability of the entity submitting a proposal, as well as the subordinate
consideration of the fees to be received by the United States.196 The Act
further limits the term of such concessions contracts from 30 years to a
general rule of 10 years or less, but up to 20 years if the longer term is needed
for the “required construction of capital improvements.”197
Relevant to this litigation, the 1998 Act replaced concessioners’
“possessory interest” and its valuation formula with a “leasehold surrender
interest” and a more straightforward valuation formula.198 The leasehold
surrender interest gives the concessioner “a right to compensation for the
capital improvement to the extent of the value of the concessioner’s leasehold
surrender interest,” which would be determined by a formula set forth in the
statute.199 However, title to any capital improvements in the National Park
System “shall be vested in the United States.”200 The Act created a National
Park Service Concessions Management Advisory Board,201 and provides rules
for approval of fees and rates to be charged by the concessioners.202 However,
legacy contracts entered into prior to 1998 remain governed by certain

192 Id. § 403, at 3504. One exception to the public solicitation requirement is for temporary
contracts or extensions of 3 years or less to “avoid interruption of services,” after the Secretary has
taken reasonable steps to avoid interruption of services. Id. § 403(11), at 3507-08.
193 Id. § 403(7), (9), at 3506-07.
194 Id. § 403(8), at 3506-07.
195 See id. § 403(5), (7)(c), at 3505-06 (listing criteria for “best proposal”).
196 54 U.S.C. § 101913(1)-(5).
197 § 404, 112 Stat. at 3508. See supra note 161 (noting that in 1958, the term of concession
contracts was extended to a period of up to 30 years).
198 § 405, 112 Stat. at 3508-10.
199 Id. § 405(a)(1), (3), at 3508.
200 Id. § 405(d), at 3510.
201 Id. § 409, at 3512-14.
202 Id. §§ 406-407, at 3510-12.
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provisions of the 1965 Act in certain circumstances, including those relating
to the possessory interest.203
Delaware North thus asserted that the trademarks were “intangible
property” in which it held a possessory interest, that it had been required to
purchase this intangible property when it took over as concessioner from
YP&CC, and that it was thus entitled to compensation from its successor.204
It valued the trademarks and other intangible property at “no less than $44
million.”205
In response, the NPS alleged that Delaware North did not in fact own
these trademarks and that Delaware North had misled the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in applying for the marks in the first
place. Specifically, in its responses to the Complaint and First Amended
Complaint, the NPS asserted that at Yosemite National Park, “all of the
hotels, restaurants and recreational infrastructure, known as Concession
Facilities, are owned by the United States,” an arrangement that spares the
private concessioners from paying property taxes.206 The NPS asserted that
in its 1992/93 proposal for a concession contract, Delaware North notified the
NPS of its intention to develop a “Yosemite National Park logo” which would
be trademarked, and that Delaware North represented that it “would go
forward with the program only with full [National Park Foundation]
approval.”207 The NPS alleged, however, that Delaware North “never sought
approval” from it or from the National Park Foundation208 with respect to its
proposed trademarks “or even advised the NPS of the program directly.”209
Instead, according to the NPS:
in 2002, without providing notice to NPS of its intent to do so, Delaware
North filed applications with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) to register serval trademarks related to properties owned by the
United States at Yosemite. These included applications to register trademarks
for the phrase “Yosemite National Park,” and for the names of iconic hotels
203 See 54 U.S.C. § 101915(c) (governing contracts entered into prior to Nov. 13, 1998, and
listing specific rules depending upon whether an existing concessioner is awarded a new contract or
whether the new contract goes to a new concessioner); 54 U.S.C. § 101915(e) (making clear that title
to any improvements vests in the United States).
204 DNC Amended Complaint, supra note 172, ¶¶ 10-33.
205 Id. ¶ 34.
206 Amended Answer to DNC Amended Complaint, supra note 179, ¶ 154-55. All of the
allegations in the various complaints and responses thereto are merely allegations.
207 Id. ¶ 156.
208 The National Park Foundation is the official charitable partner of the National Park
Service, which not only accepts charitable contributions, but also manages licensing agreements for
the NPS logos. Become a Corporate Partner, Licensing, NAT’L PARK FOUND.,
https://www.nationalparks.org/support/become-corporate-partner [https://perma.cc/5KQR-6YJS].
209 Amended Answer to DNC Amended Complaint, supra note 179, ¶ 156.
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and recreation areas, including “The Ahwahnee,” “Wawona,” “Yosemite
Lodge,” “Badger Pass,” and “Curry Village.210

The NPS noted that “Ahwahnee” is the name of the “historic hotel
commissioned by the NPS in 1925–1927 to accommodate tourism in Yosemite
National Park,” and that the hotel was designated as a National Historic
Landmark in 1987.211 The Wawona Hotel was built in 1876, and renamed
“Wawona” in 1883.212 The Wawona was designated a National Historic
Landmark in 1987 as well.213 Curry Village is a “historic tent and rustic
lodging facility” in Yosemite that “carries the namesake of the original
concessioners of the facility, David Curry and Jenny Foster Curry.”214 The
name of the village changed from “Camp Curry” to “Curry Village” in 1970
and the facilities were added to the National Register of Historic Places in
1979.215 Badger Pass is a ski area within Yosemite National Park, but is not a
historic landmark.216 At each of these facilities, commercial services,
including lodging, food and beverage, and related services, are provided to
tourists by third-party private concessioners operating “under contract with
the NPS.”217
In perhaps its greatest show of chutzpah, in 2002, Delaware North applied
to the USPTO to trademark the name “Yosemite National Park” itself.218
Several months later, the USPTO rejected Delaware North’s application “in
part, because the trademark would have presented a false association between
Delaware North and the NPS.”219 The examiner determined that “‘Yosemite
National Park’ identifies the National Park Service, and Yosemite National
Park ‘is an extremely famous national park.’”220 The NPS answer alleged that
to counter this conclusion of a false association, Delaware North submitted
three pages of its concession contract with the NPS, while redacting text
demonstrating both the NPS’s control over merchandise and services within
the Park, as well as the limited lifetime of the concession contract itself.221
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Id. ¶ 163.
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Subsequently, the USPTO “reversed its earlier ruling rejecting [Delaware
North]’s petition” for this trademark.222
While the litigation was pending, Scott Gediman, the NPS Assistant
Superintendent for Public and Legislative Affairs stated to the press, “[w]e
feel Half Dome and El Capitan and the Ahwahnee Hotel (and other
trademarked names at Yosemite) are part of the national park’s fabric. We feel
those names are inextricably linked with Yosemite . . . and ultimately belong
to the American people.”223 Notwithstanding this statement, the NPS
temporarily changed the names of the properties at issue in the litigation in
Yosemite National Park.224 During the pendency of the litigation, the NPS
renamed the Wawona Hotel the “Big Trees Lodge” and the Ahwahnee Hotel
the “Majestic Yosemite Hotel.” Curry Village became “Half Dome Village,”
and Badger Pass Ski Area became the “Yosemite Ski & Snowboard Area.”225
The NPS contended that it did this to avoid any claim that it was infringing
upon the disputed trademarks until the matter was resolved.226 Delaware
North alleged, in contrast, that the NPS had “devised and implemented a
plan to change the iconic names of properties in Yosemite” in order to “drive
down the value” of the trademarks and to “create a public outcry that would
force [Delaware North] to relinquish” its intangible property at less than fair
market value.227
Indeed, a public outcry did follow these name changes.228 The NPS
changed the names suddenly and without warning. In some cases, the iconic
names were simply covered over with tape.229 Guests at the hotels reportedly
removed some of the tape in “protest.”230 The Washington Post reported that
while anywhere else this would be a simple trademark dispute, in Yosemite
“it’s being perceived as an affront to the entire point of preserving nature for
public use.”231 Alfred Runte, historian of the park, commented, “Delaware
222 Id. ¶ 166. During the pendency of the lawsuit, the NPS filed a petition to cancel Delaware
North’s registrations for these trademarks. Id. ¶ 208. The USPTO upheld Delaware North’s motion
to stay the proceedings until the Tucker Act litigation before the Court of Federal Claims was
resolved. Id. ¶ 212.
223 James Lucas, The Yosemite Trademark Dispute Explained, CLIMBING (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://www.climbing.com/news/the-yosemite-name-dispute-explained/ [https://perma.cc/BGY4-TEQK].
224 DNC Amended Complaint, supra note 172, ¶¶ 10-33.
225 Robin Abcarian, California Journal: Yosemite’s Big Switch to New Place Names? Park Visitors
Would Love a Switchback, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2016, 2:30 AM), https://www.
latimes.com/local/abcarian/la-me-0304-abcarian-yosemite-ahwahnee-20160304-column.html
[https://perma.cc/35AG-YGZV].
226 Amended Answer to DNC Amended Complaint, supra note 179, ¶ 69.
227 DNC Amended Complaint, supra note 224, ¶ 68.
228 Abcarian, supra note 225.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Kaplan, supra note 18.
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North has seen a way to create a poison pill to discourage other would-be
bidders,” and called efforts to trademark the historic names “ludicrous.”232
Ultimately, in 2019, the parties settled the lawsuit.233 Under the terms of
the settlement, the NPS paid Delaware North approximately $3.84 million
and Aramark paid $8.16 million for its intangible property.234 Aramark was
permitted to use the historic names during the pendency of its concession
contract, and at the end of the concession contract, the names would revert
to the full control of the NPS.235 Future concession agreements will make
clear that private firms cannot own the trademarks or names of features of
the parks.236 Upon the announcement of the settlement, Gediman stated:
“I’ve said from literally Day One that these names belong with these places,
and ultimately belong to the American people.”237 When the tape and tarps
were finally removed to reveal the original names after the settlement was
announced, according to Gediman, “[p]eople were crying.”238
The irony, of course, is that while members of the public were outraged
at the idea that a private corporation could “own” the name of a historic
landmarked property in a national park, these hotels were built and run by
private companies for their entire lifespan. The Ahwahnee Hotel was built
between 1925 and 1927 by the Yosemite Park & Curry Company.239 In the
1986 Nomination Form to place the Ahwahnee Hotel on the National
Register of Historic Places, the Architectural Historian of the National Park
Service, Southwest Region,240 classified the building as privately owned, and
listed the owner of the property as the Yosemite Park & Curry Company.241
232 Kurtis Alexander, Names of Yosemite’s Sacred Sites Threatened by Trademark Spat, SFGATE
(Jan. 2, 2015, 9:45 AM), https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Names-of-Yosemite-s-sacred-sitesthreatened-by-5989558.php [https://perma.cc/Y8S7-Q3LG].
233 Stipulation of Dismissal, DNC Parks & Resorts at Yosemite, Inc. v. United States, No. 151034 (Fed. Cl. July 15, 2019); Lawsuit Settled Between National Park Service, DNC Parks and Resorts,
and Yosemite Hospitality, LLC, over Trademarks and Service Marks, NAT’L PARK SERV.: OFF. OF
COMMC’N (July 15, 2019), https://www.nps.gov/orgs/1207/lawsuit-settled-between-national-parkservice-dnc-parks-and-resorts-and-yosemite-hospitality-llc-over-trademarks-and-servicemarks.htm [https://perma.cc/ACS7-YTLH].
234 Merrit Kennedy, Yosemite Hotels Get Their Historic Names Back After Trademark Dispute,
NPR (July 16, 2019, 3:17 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/16/742081777/yosemite-hotels-get-theirhistoric-names-back-after-trademark-dispute [https://perma.cc/SDH7-HUZQ].
235 Id.
236 Alex Wigglesworth, Yosemite to Restore Names to Historic Attractions under $12 Million Settlement,
L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2019, 5:13 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-yosemitenational-park-trademark-lawsuit-settled-20190715-story.html [https://perma.cc/SWM8-W3AK].
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Laura Soulliere Harrison, Nat’s Park Serv., National Register of Historic Places
Inventory—Nomination Form: The Awahnee Hotel at 3 (1986) (on file with author).
240 Id. at 4.
241 Id. at 1.
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Despite this legal statement regarding the hotel’s ownership, the Historic
Landmark application form concludes by stating
Perhaps more important than the list of dignitaries and famous people who
have spent time in the Ahwahnee is the hotel’s place as the heart of the
aesthetic idea of Yosemite. The magnificent scenery of the valley is enhanced
by the building’s artful contributions to the ambience of the Yosemite
experience.242

Over the years, the hotel became identified with the publicness of
Yosemite itself.
In 2014, while this dispute was brewing, Congress amended the law to
make clear that, notwithstanding trademark law, buildings and structures “on
or eligible for inclusion on the National Register” or otherwise having
landmark status may “retain the name historically associated with the building
or structure.”243 The prior version of this statute, which was in effect from
2000 to 2014, had not made clear that this ability to retain the name was
“notwithstanding . . . the Trademark Act.”244 The settlement likewise made
clear that private concessioners could not own trademarks to historic names
of features within the parks going forward, and that efforts to seek trademarks
without permission from the NPS would result in the concessioner being
barred from future government contracts.245
Concerned about this dispute over landmarked properties in Yosemite, in
2016, the State of California adopted analogous legislation to address this
issue going forward. The California Heritage Protection Act, AB 2249,
prohibits concessioners in the state parks from registering trademarks in
historic place names and requires any concessioner who seeks to do so to
Id. at 8-9.
54 U.S.C. § 302106 (“Notwithstanding section 43(c) of the Act of July 5, 1946 (known as
the Trademark Act of 1946) (15 U.S.C. 1125(c)), buildings and structures on or eligible for inclusion
on the National Register (either individually or as part of a historic district), or designated as an
individual landmark or as a contributing building in a historic district by a unit of State or local
government, may retain the name historically associated with the building or structure.”).
244 Compare 54 U.S.C. § 302106 (effective Dec. 19, 2014), with 16 U.S.C. § 470a (effective May
26, 2000 to Dec. 18, 2014).
245 See Settlement and Release Agreement, 11, DNC Parks & Resorts at Yosemite, Inc. v.
United States, No. 1:2015cv01034 (Fed. Cl. Dismissed Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nps.gov
/aboutus/foia/upload/YOSE_settlement_for_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VUS-F2UY] (“Nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed in any way to hinder or limit the United States’ ability to enact
legislation or issue regulations concerning concessioners who, after the date of the execution of this
Agreement and without express written authorization from NPS, register or file applications to
register trademarks or servicemarks on the names of properties or parks owned by the United States,
the effect of which would be to bar a concessioner from future Government contracts of any and all
kinds, including both procurement contracts and non-procurement concession contracts, or to
otherwise negatively affect a concessioner in connection with any bid for future Government
contracts (of any and all kinds).”).
242
243
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forfeit the right to bid on future state park concession contracts.246 In the
statute’s recitals, the law expressly mentions the many historic sites in
Yosemite, including the Ahwahnee and Wawona Hotels.247 The recitals
provide a rationale for the law:
California state park venues are held in public trust for the people of
California. A legal claim by an individual to have a trademark right to a name
or names associated with a venue within a state park derogates the interests
of California and the shared history of Californians, and it is indicative of a
lack of the individual’s fitness to serve as a steward of the state’s cherished
cultural heritage and places.248

Thus, California concluded that such venues are part of the public trust of
the state, and that the mere intention to seek profit through privatization of
this public good warrants debarment from future concession contracts.249
Perhaps this historic association forms the basis of the claim that the
names are themselves part of the public trust, just like the mountains and
natural features of the Valley. Joseph Sax has argued that the public trust
doctrine applies to the “greatest artifacts of our civilization,” which must be
protected against private efforts to destroy or withhold these treasures from
the public.250 While the language of public trust is used colloquially here, it
is not clear that ownership of a name implicates the concerns of the public
trust doctrine in the same way as physical ownership of land. The private firm
did not seek to destroy the hotel or exclude members of the public from
staying there, nor could it, as the physical asset is owned by the United States.
While private ownership of these names could never exclude members of
the public from staying at the hotel, visiting the park, or enjoying its splendor,
this dispute over an intangible property right nonetheless took on a similar
character to early disputes about the appropriateness of private corporate
activity within the parks. The current dispute raises concerns about whether
246 California Heritage Protection Act, ch. 413, 2016 Cal. Stat. 3269 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 5080).
247 Id. § 2, 2016 Cal. Stat. at 3270.
248 Id. § 2(f), 2016 Cal. Stat. at 3270.
249 For more on the public trust doctrine generally, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1969). The public trust
doctrine generally protects claims of the public to natural features of the landscape, most specifically
rivers, the sea, and the seashore, from the assertion of claims of private property rights. Id. at 475. Its
history traces back to Roman law, see J.B. Ruhl & Thomas A.J. McGinn, The Roman Public Trust
Doctrine: What Was It, and Does It Support an Atmospheric Trust? 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3440244
[https://perma.cc/WMM4-UVX6],
although it has a uniquely American signature. Rose, supra note 13, at 727-30, 735-39 (discussing the
development of the public trust doctrine in U.S. law with respect to submerged lands).
250 See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 1, 9-10 (1999).
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private corporations can remove names that are deeply associated with the
parks from the public domain and call them private. There is no question that
nothing was physically extracted from the parks to be sold in markets during
this dispute. Perhaps the harm here is that Delaware North sought to extract
some intangible, public goodwill that has long been associated with the name
of the hotel. The firm’s outrage at the NPS decision to change the names
during the pendency of the litigation, and thus perhaps to drive down their
value, is evidence of this desire to profit from public goodwill. By seeking to
commoditize the name of the hotel (and the park itself) for private gain
(namely to sell it to the next concessioner if Delaware North did not receive
a contract extension), the private firm crossed a line similar to that of private
firms seeking to extract and sell timber from the parks. It is merely a different,
less tangible form of interference with the publicness of the parks.
B. Corporate Philanthropy and Cause-Related Marketing
The second set of non-extractive corporate interactions with the parks is
formal corporate philanthropy, including co-branding and cause-related
marketing. Like the dispute over trademarks, these relationships do not
physically harm the parks or physically extract a commodity for sale in private
markets. Nonetheless, they implicate questions of how much corporate
activity in the parks is too much, and where the boundary ought to be drawn
between public and private.
1. Corporate Philanthropy and Cause-Related Marketing Generally
Corporate giving and marketing for the benefit of a non-profit or public
organization can take many forms. Philanthropy includes direct contributions
to organizations by corporations or their related foundations.251 Co-branding
is a marketing strategy that combines the use of multiple brand names to
build on the strength of both brands. In some cases, both of the brands are
private firms like Pottery Barn (home furnishings) and Sherwin-Williams
(paints),252 or Taco Bell and Frito-Lay’s Doritos (which generated the Doritos
Locos Taco).253 In other cases, the co-branding strategy involves a corporate
brand and a nonprofit entity that allows the firm to promote a corporate social
251 Kahn, supra note 35, at 587-88 (distinguishing charitable contributions (direct grants by
corporations and corporate foundations) from cause-related marketing or other sponsorship events).
252 Pottery Barn, Sherwin-Williams Paint Partnership, HOME FURNISHINGS BUS. (July 10, 2013),
http://hfbusiness.com/hfbnow/articleid/96/pottery-barn-sherwin-williams-paint-partnership
[https://perma.cc/6W46-WNRY].
253 Taco Bell Partners with Frito-Lay on Doritos Locos Tacos, CSP DAILY NEWS (Mar. 8, 2012),
https://www.cspdailynews.com/snacks-candy/taco-bell-partners-frito-lay-doritos-locos-tacos
[https://perma.cc/G8SY-4PY4].
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responsibility initiative.254 This type of co-branding is sometimes referred to
as “cause marketing” or “cause-related marketing.”255
There are many well-known examples of cause-related marketing
campaigns in which a corporation partners with a non-profit or charitable
organization to raise money for the charity while raising brand awareness for
the corporate partner. One example is American Express’s efforts to raise
money for the restoration of the Statue of Liberty.256 During the fourth
quarter of 1983, the firm donated one cent to the restoration efforts each time
an American Express card was used.257 The effort raised $1.7 million dollars
for the restoration and the firm reported that usage of its card increased by
thirty percent during that quarter, although it was not possible to attribute
all of that increase to the marketing campaign.258 Another significant causerelated marketing example is Bank of America’s support for the Susan G.
Komen Foundation, which raises money for breast cancer research.259 Bank
of America has pledged to donate to the Foundation for each new Susan G.
Komen Cash Rewards Card opened and used for purchases.260 Since 2009,
the campaign has raised over $9.5 million for the cause.261
Cause-related marketing can also include in-kind donations. For example,
since 2006, Pampers, a unit of Proctor & Gamble (P&G), has partnered with
UNICEF to donate one tetanus vaccination for each pack of Pampers
purchased (its 1 Pack = 1 Vaccine campaign).262 To date, through this
campaign, P&G has donated 300 million doses of the vaccine globally.263
Other firms, like the outdoor retailer Patagonia, engage in projects that are
ongoing, rather than time-limited. Since 1985, pursuant to its 1% for the
Planet campaign, Patagonia has pledged to donate 1% of its profits (totaling

254 Alexander Chernev & Sean Blair, Doing Well by Doing Good: The Benevolent Halo of Corporate
Social Responsibility, 41 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 1412, 1412 (2015).
255 See Kahn, supra note 35, at 664 (discussing the distinction between cause-related marketing and
charitable giving); NAT’L PARK SERV.. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, Director’s Order #21: Donations
and Philanthropic Partnerships, (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.nps.gov/policy /DOrders/DO_21.htm
[https://perma.cc/8TE2-AYLC] [hereinafter DO21] (using the term “cause marketing”).
256 Martin Gottlieb, Cashing in on Higher Cause, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 1986),
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/06/business/cashing-in-on-higher-cause.html
[https://perma.cc/Q2TB-JK6H].
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Susan G. Komen® Cash Rewards Visa® Credit Card from Bank of America, B ANK OF A M .,
https://www.bankofamerica.com/credit-cards/products/susan-komen-credit-card/
[https://perma.cc/U7A2-4W3X].
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 UNICEF Corporate and Philanthropic Partnerships: P&G Pampers, UNICEF,
https://www.unicef.org/corporate_partners/index_pampers.html [https://perma.cc/57PW-S6M9].
263 Id.
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more than $89 million to date), to support “domestic and international
grassroots environmental groups.”264
2. Philanthropy and Cause-Related Marketing in the National Parks
The NPS accepts both monetary and in-kind donations through its official
charitable partner, the National Park Foundation (NPF).265 Corporate
partners can engage with the NPF in multiple ways that, according to the
NPF, “not only contribute to the NPF’s mission but also provide sales,
marketing and/or promotional value to our partners.”266 These forms of
engagement include licensing, philanthropy, cause-related marketing,
program or event sponsorship, and in-kind support.267 The NPS has a long
history of receiving private philanthropy. In its earliest years, wealthy
individuals like the Rockefellers, the Dorrs, the Mellons, the Kents, and the
duPonts, along with their family foundations, donated land or money to
create parks and museums, or to construct roads and visitor centers now under
the control of the NPS.268 While individuals and family or institutional
foundations remain significant donors to the parks, corporations are now also
actively participating in this space.269 Indeed, for fiscal year 2018, while
individuals and family foundations donated a total of $34.3 million to the
parks, corporations contributed $31.1 million.270
With respect to licensing, the NPF explains that commercial use of the
NPF or NPS trademarked logos is “expressly prohibited unless the producer
completes a license agreement” with the NPF.271 Cause-related marketing
both benefits the parks and offers firms “integrated-marketing campaigns that
enable corporations to leverage the popularity of America’s national parks to
support corporate initiatives while helping increase public awareness and
funding.”272 Philanthropy allows firms to meet their “corporate responsibility

264 1% for the Planet, PATAGONIA, https://www.patagonia.com/one-percent-for-theplanet.html [https://perma.cc/V5PT-A5V9].
265 Mission & History, NAT’L PARK FOUND., https://www.nationalparks.org/aboutfoundation/mission-history [https://perma.cc/749H-NU2F].
266 Become a Corporate Partner, NAT’L PARK FOUND., https://www.nationalparks.org
/support/become-corporate-partner [https://perma.cc/749H-NU2F].
267 Id.
268 Barry Macintosh, Philanthropy and the Parks in the 20th Century, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/articles/philanthropy-and-the-national-parks.htm [https://perma.cc/NE5N-6N2L].
269 NAT’L PARK FOUND., supra note 28, at 38.
270 Id. at 38. In addition, in 2018, institutional foundations contributed $9 million and
government grants contributed $10.3 million. Id.
271 Licensing, NAT’L PARK FOUND. https://www.nationalparks.org/support/become-corporatepartner/licensing [https://perma.cc/XM4V-UH3C].
272 Id.
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goals.”273 Finally, business firms can “direct their sponsorship to a specific
NPF program or event,”274 such as programs to increase trail accessibility and
reduce erosion, to protect and restore ocean wildlife in Alaska, or to improve
student engagement at specific parks.275
The NPF has many corporate donors, some having provided more than
$1 million to date in support of the parks. Subaru, for example, has provided
more than $20 million in support since 2013, and has shared expertise on a
zero-landfill initiative that has helped the parks to eliminate more than 6
million pounds of waste.276 Other donors contributing more than $1 million
to the parks include American Express, Budweiser, Coca-Cola, Hanes, L.L.
Bean, Nature Valley, Nissan, and Union Pacific Railroad.277 Major donors
contributing between $500,000 and $999,999 include Boeing and Winnebago
Industries.278 There are many additional business firms that contribute smaller
amounts to the NPF, including both national brands and smaller local brands.279
Congress has authorized the NPS to accept “money that may be donated
for the purposes of the [Park] System.”280 In 2014, Congress enacted
legislation governing the proper scope of national park donor
acknowledgment.281 That statute permits the NPS to recognize a donor to the
national parks in certain specified ways.282 However, no donor may be
recognized as “an official sponsor” of the NPS or the National Park System.283
Nor may any donor state or imply NPS endorsement of a donor’s product or
service.284 Further, despite concerns about naming the parks after corporate
sponsors, Congress has expressly provided that no donor can be
acknowledged in the naming of any unit of the National Park System or even

Become a Corporate Partner, supra note 266.
Id.
All Programs, NAT’L PARK FOUND., https://www.nationalparks.org/our-work/programs/allprograms [https://perma.cc/QD2D-FSB9].
276 Corporate
Partners, NAT’L PARK FOUND., https://www.nationalparks.org/aboutfoundation/partnerships/corporate-partnerships/corporate-partners [https://perma.cc/5G8A-9ZQG].
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 54 U.S.C. § 101101(2). This authorization is required to overcome the default rule that any
money received by the federal government be deposited into the Treasury under the Miscellaneous
Receipts Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b).
281 National Parks Service and Related Programs, Pub. L. No. 113-287, 128 Stat. 3094 (2014)
(codified in relevant part at 54 U.S.C. § 100101 et seq.); Carl Levin & Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. 113-291, § 3054(b), 128 Stat. 3292,
3806 (2014) (codified in relevant part at 54 U.S.C. § 101101).
282 § 3054(b)(1), 128 Stat. at 3806.
283 Id. § 3054(b)(2)(A), 128 Stat. at 3806. In addition, donor acknowledgments may not use an
advertising slogan or promote or oppose a political candidate. Id. § 3054(3)(C), at 3807.
284 Id. § 3054(b)(2)(B), 128 Stat. at 3806.
273
274
275

82

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 33

a facility within the parks, such as a visitor center.285 This statute, however,
leaves discretion for the NPS to permit other forms of corporate
acknowledgment within the parks. Indeed, the 2016 update to NPS Director’s
Order #21286 gave an expansive interpretation of this NPS discretion, leading
some critics to decry the expansion of naming rights for corporations within
the national parks for
interpretive and digital media (exhibits, waysides, and audiovisual
productions); donor recognition boards and walls; plaques or nameplates;
donor books; paving stones and park furnishings; on or inside a park visitor
center or administrative facility; outside a visitor or administrative facility
(including bench or other park furnishings, brick, pathway, area of
landscaping, or plaza); near a park construction or restoration project (when
related to the project); and limited opportunities for naming interior spaces,
and NPS positions, programs, endowments.287

With respect to such acknowledgment of corporate donations, the
Director of the NPS must expressly authorize the installation of any
monument or other “commemorative installation” in a park area.288 And
federal regulations prohibit the display and distribution of any “[c]ommercial
notices or advertisements” on federally owned or controlled land within a
park area without prior written permission of the specific Park
Superintendent, who may grant such permission only if the notices are found
to be “desirable and necessary for the convenience and guidance of the public.”289
Special rules exist for the Arrowhead Symbol, which has been the official
insignia of the NPS since 1962, and the Parkscape Symbol, which is the
“official tie tack or pin to be worn by all National Park Service uniformed
employees.”290 The Director of the NPS may authorize the “reproduction,
manufacture, sale, and use” of these two symbols for “uses that will contribute
Id.
DO21, supra note 255.
Id.; see also Lisa Rein, Yosemite, Sponsored by Starbucks? National Parks to Start Selling Some
Naming Rights, WASH. POST. (May 9, 2016, 10:23 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/powerpost/wp/2016/05/09/yosemite-national-park-brought-to-you-by-starbucks/
[https://perma.cc/P7CY-2UZ2] (“But the new brand of philanthropy is drawing fierce criticism from
watchdogs and park advocates who accuse [NPS Director Jonathan] Jarvis of embracing a creeping
commercialization they say has no place in the park system.”); Joe Davidson, Park Service and
Corporate Advertising, a Dangerous Mix, WASH. POST (May 9, 2016, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/05/09/park-service-and-corporateadvertising-a-dangerous-mix/ [https://perma.cc/R2PT-XDWU] (“Already parks hoist banners with
Budweiser beer and other corporate logos. Where will it stop? Can you imagine Disney presents
Yellowstone?”).
288 36 C.F.R. § 2.62(a) (2019).
289 Id. § 5.1.
290 Id. § 11.1.
285
286
287
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to purposes of education and conservation as they relate to the program of
the National Park Service. All other uses are prohibited.”291 Such permission
can be revoked if later found to be “injurious to their integrity” or
inconsistent with the NPS programs of “conservation and recreation.”292
Penalties for violation of these laws include a fine, imprisonment for up to six
months, or both.293
Director’s Order #21 sets forth several additional “negative-screen”
limitations on philanthropy and cause-related marketing in the parks. For
example, the Order states that the NPS will not accept donations from
organizations in which an NPS employee is an officer or director,294 from a
party engaged in litigation with the NPS,295 or from a current concessioner
or those seeking a contract.296 The NPS may not engage in fundraising that
“identifies the NPS with tobacco or any type of illegal product,”297 or that
would “generate controversy, harm public confidence, or associate the NPS
with products that are inconsistent with [the NPS] mission.”298 Finally, the
NPS “should only agree to a cause marketing campaign when the relationship
strengthens its assets and brand.”299
3. Corporate Cause-Related Marketing in State Parks
In addition to philanthropic donations to the parks by national
corporations, firms engage in other creative ways to provide funds to national
and state parks. State parks have innovated in this regard with local
businesses and have taken different approaches including partnerships and
cause-related marketing with local breweries, wineries, and other businesses
that donate a portion of proceeds from sales or events to the parks.
Because this Article thus far has focused on national parks, it is worth
pausing for a moment to note that the state parks are experiencing some of
the same challenges. State parks generate approximately 2.5 times as many
visits annually as the national parks.300 While visits to the national parks
increased to more than 330 million in 2017, in that same year, visits to state
Id. § 11.2.
Id. § 11.3.
Id. § 11.4; 18 U.S.C. § 701.
DO21, supra note 255, § 3.1.1.
Id. § 5.1.1. But see id. § 5.5 (“In some cases, however, the context of the proposed donation
may be sufficiently removed from the litigation that it will not appear to be an attempt to influence
the litigation.”).
296 Id. § 5.1.1.
297 Id. § 4.3.
298 Id. § 5.1.1.
299 Id. § 4.3.1.1.
300 Jordan W. Smith, Emily J. Wilkins & Yu-Fai Leung, Attendance Trends Threaten Future
Operations of America’s State Park Systems, 116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 12775, 127775 (2019).
291
292
293
294
295
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parks reached 807 million.301 The 807 million visits in 2017 represented a
25.6% increase since 1984, while the 300 million visits to national parks
represented a 33% increase over the same time period.302 During this time of
significant increases in visitation, funding allocated to the state parks
nationwide decreased from a peak of $3.74 billion in 2006 to $2.59 billion in
2017.303 Costs of managing the increasing numbers of visitors have not
remained stable. In addition to ordinary maintenance from wear and tear, the
parks face new challenges like climate change, which will likely alter visitation
rates. Indeed, research suggests that visits will increase as ambient
temperatures increase, up to a point.304
An increasing number of visitors combined with declining state
appropriations to the parks has led some state park management agencies to
seek funds from other sources, including through “entrance fees, permits,
[and] donations.”305 Smith et al. note that in addition to increasing entrance
fees, state park management agencies have implemented “innovative
solutions” like “direct funding of individual state park units by corporations
within the outdoor recreation industry;” sales of “unique license plates” that
act as annual entrance permits; and “partnering with local communities in
comanagement arrangements.”306
States have developed various rules governing these corporate
philanthropic and cause-related marketing programs. These rules lie along a
spectrum of comfort with corporate partnerships and acknowledgments. At
the more restrictive end of the spectrum is the State of California, which
employs a positive screen on philanthropy and cause-related marketing.
California permits as corporate sponsors only those corporations whose
missions share a “nexus” with the values that the California parks system
seeks to promote, including a “particular emphasis on programs promoting
environmental, historical and cultural awareness, healthful living, education,
and high-quality outdoor recreation.”307 And California makes clear that,
based on the “goals, mission, and identity of California State Parks,” park
administrators “could justify prohibiting partnerships with those
301 Id.; National Park System Sees More Than 330 Million Visits, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Feb. 28,
2018), https://www.nps.gov/orgs/1207/02-28-2018-visitation-certified.htm [https://perma.cc/2GEEK22V] (counting the number of visitors to national parks in 2017).
302 Smith et al., supra note 300, at 12775.
303 Id. The 2006 figure is inflation adjusted.
304 Id. at 12775-76 (discussing economic challenges that state parks will face in light of climate change
and increased public demand for state parks, and offering tentative policy solutions to those challenges).
305 Id. at 12779 (noting that Colorado and Wyoming have increased entrance fees, with
Wyoming implementing a peak-use pricing system).
306 Id. at 12779.
307 Corporate Sponsorship Criteria,
CAL. DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION,
https://www.parks.ca.gov/?page_id=25417 [https://perma.cc/GNJ7-J7J9].
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organizations and companies that are inconsistent with this purpose.”308
Thus, major California “Proud Partners” who “align themselves” with an
individual park or region and provide financial support include the Save the
Redwoods League, Surfline, Jack’s Surfboards, the Smithsonian Institution,
and Easy2Hike.309
At the other end of the spectrum of comfort with corporate partnerships
is the State of Tennessee. Tennessee has entered into a creative cause-related
marketing arrangement with a local brewery.310 The State has authorized
Tennessee Brew Works (TBW) to use the marketing label “State Park Blonde
Ale” on one of its beers in exchange for the donation of a portion of the
proceeds to benefit the Tennessee State Parks.311 According to Morgan
Gilman, the Director of Revenue and Guest Experience for the Tennessee
State Parks, informal discussions about the arrangement began four or five
years ago when TBW opened in Nashville: “The owners of the brewery were
very passionate about the environment, and about giving back to the state
parks. We began discussions with them about how to create a beer that would
give back to state parks.”312 Gilman noted that while other breweries in the
state had previously supported one park or created a “limited” release, this
was the first effort to create an agreement to support the state park system as
a whole.313
The program launched in the summer of 2017. Under the agreement, for
each case of State Park Blonde Ale sold, TBW donates fifty cents to the
Tennessee State Park Conservancy, a 501(c)(3) non-profit entity that accepts
donations on behalf of the Tennessee state parks.314 TBW has partnered with
its distributors to match that donation. In total, the Tennessee state parks
receive one dollar per case sold.315 In exchange, Randy Hedgepath, the
Tennessee State Naturalist, “agreed to allow the Brewery to use a drawing of
his likeness wearing what resembles a state park Ranger hat on the beer bottle
and packaging.”316 In addition, according to Associate Counsel for the
Id.
Proud Partners and Financial Support Programs, CAL. DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION,
https://www.parks.ca.gov/?page_id=24417 [https://perma.cc/YUX9-NPGV].
310 Telephone Interview with Morgan Gilman, Dir. of Revenue & Guest Experience, Tenn.
State Parks & Will Kerby, Assoc. Counsel, Tenn. State Parks (Nov. 21, 2019) (notes on file with
author) [hereinafter Gilman & Kerby Interview]; Telephone Interview with Christian Spears,
Founder and President, Tenn. Brew Works (Nov. 21, 2019) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter
Spears Interview].
311 See supra sources cited note 310.
312 Gilman & Kerby Interview, supra note 310.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id. An image of the beer bottle is available online. State Park Blonde, TENN. BREW WORKS,
https://www.tnbrew.com/beer/stateparkblonde [https://perma.cc/GP95-E7JT].
308
309
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Tennessee State Parks Will Kerby, the state agreed that TBW could place an
image of the Tennessee State Parks official logo on the bottle and packaging
to “show a charitable relationship and that donations are going to the
Tennessee State Parks Conservancy.”317 He elaborated, “[t]hat is the only
official image that the Brewery is permitted to use. We determined that the
use of the logo in this limited fashion was appropriate in light of the
relationship” under the particular agreement between the parties, “because it
is not used in the branding of the product” but rather to “indicate a charitable
relationship.”318 Importantly, the officials from the State Parks made clear that
this relationship with TBW is not exclusive; it is not the sole “official partner”
of the parks. Indeed, the state parks would work with other private entities
who sought to enter into similar charitable relationships to raise funds.319
Since July 2017, the TBW-Tennessee relationship has raised approximately
$16,000 for the Tennessee state parks.320
From the perspective of Christian Spears, the founder and President of
Tennessee Brew Works, the State Park Blonde Ale partnership was not only
a way to promote the state parks specifically, but also a way to “launch our
all-Tennessee sourced grains initiative . . . . Spirits are the number one export
for Tennessee and breweries are the fastest growing industry. We want to
develop a new cash crop for Tennessee.”321 TBW is not a benefit corporation
under state law or a certified B-Corp, but a for-profit LLC that nonetheless
has “a strong mission to benefit the community.”322
Other states have entered into similar cause-related marketing
agreements to benefit their parks. For example, the Michigan Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) created the “Goods for Good” program.323 In
2004, the Michigan DNR lost all general revenue support from the state.324
The DNR runs the parks “like a business” by using campground fees to
Gilman & Kerby Interview, supra note 310.
Id.
Id.
See Spears Interview, supra note 310.
Id.
Id. A benefit corporation is a creation of state law, under which a business firm must pursue
not only profit for shareholders, but both a general benefit and designate a specific social purpose.
A certified B-corp, on the other hand, may or may not be a benefit corporation under state law, but
rather is certified by B-Lab, a private non-governmental organization that requires a firm to
designate a social purpose and meet certain criteria for continued certification. See Sarah E. Light,
The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 185-190 (2019) (discussing
benefit corporations under state law and the parallel B-corp private certification scheme).
323 These
Goods are Good for Michigan, MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. RES.,
http://www.michigandnr.com/Publications/PDFS/TheseGoods/ [https://perma.cc/9P2E-QHL6]
(listing beer, coffee, t-shirts, hats, artwork, candles, bug spray, and other goods that support the parks).
324 Telephone Interview with Maia Turek, Res. Dev. Specialist, Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res. (Nov.
26, 2019) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Turek Interview].
317
318
319
320
321
322
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support the parks. However, the parks still have a significant infrastructure
deficit.325 According to Maia Turek, Resource Development Specialist at
DNR Parks and Recreation, the Goods for Good program began about six
years ago.326 The goal is not only to raise money to run the parks, but to do
so by “increasing awareness about the state parks without spending any
advertising dollars.”327
The first program created by the DNR under the program was “Wines
for the Outdoors” in 2015—a program open to any business with statewide
distribution.328 Chateau Grand Traverse was the first partner and has created
three “custom-labeled” wines for which fifty percent of net profits go to
benefit the state park system.329 The program allows state residents to vote
on how the proceeds of wine sales should be spent: to repair trails, to promote
accessibility, or to replace trees.330 The winery does not dictate the use of the
funds. A second partner under the Goods for Good program umbrella is
Espresso Royale, a coffee roaster, which created the “Love Our Parks, Love
Our Coffee” program in partnership with the DNR.331 A portion of proceeds
is donated to the parks.332 In addition, the DNR partnered with New Holland
Brewing, which partnered with REI Co-op, Merrell, and Woosah Outfitters,
to “craft Lake and Trail Lager, a copper lager that according to the brewery is
perfect for drinking after a day of hiking Michigan’s scenic state park trails.”333
Other businesses sell candles, bug spray, and athletic gear to support the parks
under this program. The State has also partnered with small entities that wish
to support a single local park, rather than the state park system as a whole.334
Michigan also has created a program called Tourism Cares, which supports
restoration projects in the state parks. Firms and their employees can
participate in short-term restoration projects through this program. The
program has generated almost $1 million in material and labor in support of

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Press Release, MyNorth News Service, Chateau Grand Traverse’s Wines of the Great
Outdoors (May 19, 2015), https://mynorth.com/2015/05/chateau-grand-traverses-wines-of-the-greatoutdoors/ [https://perma.cc/V6KY-GUUC] (citing 50% figure).
330 Id.
331 Jessica Haynes, Ann Arbor Coffee Firm To Sell Outdoor-Themed Blends at State Parks, MLIVE (Apr. 17,
2017), https://www.mlive.com/business/ann-arbor/2017/04/ann_arbor_coffee_company_unvei.html [https://
perma.cc/9GLN-AHJ7].
332 Id.
333 Brandon Champion, New Holland Unveils Lager to Celebrate 100 Years of Michigan State Parks,
MLIVE (May 20, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/2019/05/new-holland-unveils-lager-tocelebrate-100-years-of-michigan-state-parks.html [https://perma.cc/8PZ6-REMG].
334 Telephone Interview with Maia Turek, supra note 324.
325
326
327
328
329
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the parks.335 In 2019, these various partnerships and programs raised
approximately $150,000 for the state parks.336
A key concern on the part of the Michigan DNR is raising funds without
compromising the publicness of the parks. As Turek explained: “[W]e don’t
want marked parks or named parks with corporate names. We have to set
limits for public lands.”337 Thus, while state parks recognize the financial and
in-kind support they receive from corporate partnerships, even those states
with the fewest restrictions, such as Tennessee and Michigan, recognize the
importance of preserving the publicness of the parks.
Local corporate initiatives tend to have more public support than
sponsorships by national corporations. There is a small empirical literature
on public reactions to corporate sponsorship of state and local parks that bears
this out. For example, one study found that members of the public were more
supportive of local business firms financially sponsoring the parks than
national corporations.338 The study asked participants about twenty-two
different types of promotional activities between a corporation and a local
park, varying whether the sponsor was a local or national business, whether
there was off-site or on-site recognition of the sponsor, and whether the
amount of the sponsorship to the park was small ($1,000) or large
($500,000).339 The results demonstrated that a significant majority (71%)
perceived corporate sponsorship of public-sector parks and recreation
favorably.340 However, sponsorships by local businesses were perceived more
favorably than those by national corporations. And, importantly, sponsorships
that included on-site recognition of the corporation in the title of the park
and recreation facilities, as well as exclusive sponsorship contracts, among
others, were perceived to be least appropriate.341 These perceptions seem
largely consistent with the regulations and guidance that govern corporate
partnerships with both the state and national parks systems. Those
Id.
Id.
Id.
Andrew J. Mowen, Gerard T. Kyle & Mick Jackowski, Citizen Preferences for the Corporate
Sponsorship of Public-Sector Park and Recreation Organizations, 18 J. NONPROFIT & PUB. SECTOR
MKTG., no. 2, 2007, at 93, 93-94. The study’s authors define sponsorship as “a cash and/or in-kind
fee paid to a property, typically a sports or event venue, in exchange for access to the marketable,
commercial potential associated with that property” Id. at 94 (citations omitted). In addition to
sporting and events venues, corporations increasingly sponsor non-profit and public sector
organizations including parks and recreation programs. Id. The study consisted of mailing a survey
to 2,250 households within the Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle metropolitan area in Pennsylvania,
which produced 578 results. Id. at 101-02. The demographics of the sample set generally matched the
demographics of the general population in the target geography. Id. at 102.
339 Id. at 103.
340 Id. at 104.
341 Id. at 105.
335
336
337
338
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regulations and guidance eschew exclusive sponsorship arrangements, naming
rights, and associations with firms in “undesirable” industries like tobacco
that could tarnish the parks’ positive reputations or diminish the publicness
of the parks in some fashion.
To summarize, the case of corporate philanthropy and cause-related
marketing raises similar issues as the cases of corporate ownership of names
of historic landmarks within the parks and concessions more broadly. In each
case, the parks benefit in some way from the corporate activity—they receive
necessary services (such as lodging and food for visitors), or cash and in-kind
donations (in the case of corporate philanthropy and cause-related
marketing). They can use these funds and services to improve or restore the
parks themselves. And it is often, though not always, the parks or the public,
rather than the firms, that define the agenda of what the money will do—
whether that is through a competitive bid for a concession contract written
by the NPS, or the procedure whereby members of the Michigan public
decide whether donated funds should go toward trail repair, promote
accessibility, or plant trees. The firms benefit as well by associating with the
parks and their positive image. Yet the parks can suffer harm as well—some
aspect of public goodwill is lost even if nothing is physically removed and the
trails and public access are improved, rather than harmed. And if it is the
corporate donor who dictates how the funds must be used, this can raise
additional concerns about democratic legitimacy. The next Part takes up the
normative questions of the benefits and harms of these non-extractive
corporate activities within the parks.
IV. THE BENEFITS AND HARMS OF CORPORATE ACTIVITY WITHIN
THE PARKS
This Part offers a normative account of non-extractive corporate activities
within the parks. It first explores the business and management literature
regarding corporate marketing to understand why, from the perspective of
the corporation, these relationships are valuable. It then examines the actual
and potential impact of these corporate activities on the parks themselves,
drawing on literature regarding corporate philanthropy, corporate
associations with nonprofit organizations, and greenwashing.
A. Benefits to Corporations from Relationships with the Parks
Corporations choose to engage in for-profit concessions activities,
marketing, or philanthropic activity in the national parks for four primary
reasons: (1) purely philanthropic intent to do good; (2) strategic intent to
profit, including by increasing brand awareness in target populations,
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improving brand perception through positive associations (a “halo effect”)
with the goodwill of the parks, or by influencing park policies and actions in
ways that benefit the donor; (3) a devious intent to provide a veneer of doing
good to enhance the firm’s reputation and conceal or minimize the effect of
other bad behavior, otherwise known as greenwashing; or (4) some
combination of these motivations. To date, there has been no in-depth
consideration within legal scholarship of the social science literature on the
implications of such corporate actions, for either the firms or the parks as the
recipients of firm philanthropy and marketing. There is, however, a
significant literature within marketing, management, and business ethics
scholarship on these topics. This literature helps to unpack both the
motivations for and implications of these corporate activities. This section
explores each potential motivation in turn.
Firms may engage in some aspects of corporate social responsibility
(CSR) with purely good intentions—simply to do good. The literature on
CSR refers to “political” CSR (as opposed to “strategic” CSR) as corporate
activity that seeks to address or solve a social problem—whether for
principled or pragmatic reasons.342 Indeed, it was this form of corporate social
responsibility that so troubled economist Milton Friedman, who argued that
corporate actions that promote “general social interest[s]” impose an
unrepresentative tax on shareholders.343 Yet, to the extent that firms market
342 See, e.g., Dorothea Baur & Hans Peter Schmitz, Corporations and NGOs: When Accountability
Leads to Co-Optation, 106 J. BUS. ETHICS 9, 17 (2012) (describing two variants of political CSR, one
that focuses on altruistic motives and the other that focuses on business-related motives). See generally
Andre Nijhof, Theo de Bruijn & Hakan Honders, Partnerships for Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Review of Concepts and Strategic Options, 46 MGMT. DECISION 152, 152–67 (2008) (analyzing the effect
of NGOs on corporations’ development of CSR strategies); Sushil Vachani, Jonathan P. Doh & Hildy
Teegen, NGOs’ Influence on MNEs’ Social Development Strategies in Varying Institutional Contexts: A
Transaction Cost Perspective, 18 INT’L BUS. REV. 446, 446–56 (2009) (examining the relationship
between NGOs and corporations in corporations’ development of CSR strategies).
343 Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedmandoctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html
[https://perma.cc/9FHX-U477];
cf.
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1911, 1921 (1996) (“The efficiency goal of maximizing the company’s value to investors remains, in
our view, the principal function of corporate law.”); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
307 (1976) (applying a profit-maximizing paradigm for analyzing the theory of the firm despite
acknowledging the attempts in other literature to replace the profit-driven paradigm). But see
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247, 299-305 (1999) (discussing the responsibility of firms to promote broader social interests valued
by other stakeholders); Einer R. Elhauge, Corporate Managers’ Operational Discretion to Sacrifice
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS 13-14
(Bruce L. Hay, Robert N. Stavins & Richard H.K. Vietor eds., 2005) (arguing that corporate
managers have “considerable implicit and explicit discretion to sacrifice profits in the public
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their philanthropy rather than donate anonymously, even the least skeptical
observer would seek other explanations or at least find mixed motivations.
The remaining motivations are based at least in part in strategic
considerations.344 As a general matter, because public sector organizations are
“relatively uncluttered” with multiple competitors, such marketing
sponsorships can be especially valuable to firms.345 One strategic reason to
engage in corporate activity within the parks (be it through concessions,
philanthropy, or cause-related marketing), is that it can be beneficial to firms
to create brand awareness in their target populations. For example, it is
beneficial for firms like Patagonia, L.L. Bean, and North Face that sell
outdoor recreation-related products to market their association with the parks
to a population that will buy their products. This explains why firms like L.L.
Bean are major corporate sponsors to the national parks.346
But what about firms that do not sell specific outdoor-recreation-related
products? Some of the biggest corporate donors to the national parks include
Subaru, American Express, Budweiser, Coca-Cola, Hanes, and Nissan,
among others.347 While one could make an argument that each of these firms
sells products that enable potential customers to enjoy the parks, the links are
more attenuated than for L.L. Bean or Patagonia. Arguably, firms with only
attenuated relationships to the parks seek to build more general awareness of
their brands and to generate a “halo effect” by associating their brands with
the goodwill of the national parks.348 The marketing literature refers to this
as building “brand equity.”349
Empirical scholarship has demonstrated that effective CSR campaigns, in
some contexts, not only create a “benevolent halo” regarding the firm’s
interest”); Light, supra note 322, at 145-46 (arguing that corporate, securities, antitrust and
bankruptcy law are all forms of environmental law and should be interpreted to prioritize the
environment in corporate decision making).
344 “Strategic” corporate social responsibility is a form of CSR that is based on the view that
taking certain socially responsible actions will ultimately be in the business interest of the firm and
will increase profits. For one article espousing this view of CSR as a win-win, see Michael E. Porter
& Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social
Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 78, 80; see also Joshua D. Margolis & James P. Walsh,
Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by Business, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 268, 270 (2003).
345 Mowen, Kyle & Jackowski, supra note 338, at 95.
346 Corporate Partners, supra note 276.
347 Id.
348 Chernev & Blair, supra note 254, at 1414; Lance Leuthesser, Chiranjeev S. Kohli & Katrin
R. Harich, Brand Equity: The Halo Effect Measure, 29 EUR. J. MKTG. 57 (1995); Steve Hoeffler &
Kevin Lane Keller, Building Brand Equity Through Corporate Societal Marketing, 21 J. PUB. POL’Y &
MKTG. 78, 80 (2002); DO21, supra note 255, § 4.3.1.3 (“Sponsorship opportunities with the NPS or
a philanthropic partner offer public recognition of the sponsor’s connection with a charitable cause,
which may help it attract new customers or clients or bolster its reputation through the ‘halo effect’
(impressions of the organization’s goodwill.)”).
349 Keller, supra note 347, at 78.
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general reputation, but also lead consumers to view the company’s products
more favorably.350 This boost in perceptions of product performance is
present even when the acts of CSR are “unrelated to the company’s core
business,” and even when actual product performance is “readily observable
and consumers can directly experience the product.”351 However, the
literature also demonstrates that when consumers believe that firms’ actions
are motivated by “self-interest rather than benevolence,” there is no such
benefit.352 Several studies have suggested that the mechanism underlying this
effect relates to moral judgments formed by consumers about firms engaging
in CSR353 and the congruence or lack thereof between the firm’s motivation
and the consumers’ own views about the importance of CSR and the role of
business in society. 354
In one well-known study, Alexander Chernev and Sean Blair undertook
four experiments to test when a fictitious firm engaging in some form of CSR
was able to attain a “halo effect” for its products. In each experiment,
participants could observe product performance directly: the taste of wine;
photos of a man’s scalp before and after a hair-loss treatment; photos of teeth
before and after the use of a whitening product; and the “sharpness” of text that
a fictitious software firm used to scan and digitize books.355 In each experiment,
the authors provided some of the test subjects with information about the firm’s
charitable giving/CSR, while control subjects did not receive this information.
In the first experiment, participants who received information about a
fictitious winery’s CSR concluded that the wine tasted better than those who
received no information about CSR.356 The perceived effect was larger when
the participants were not experts in wine tasting, as the experts were better
able to evaluate objectively the taste of the wine “based on [its] intrinsic
characteristics.”357 In the second study, which concerned the hair loss
treatment product, participants were primed with information stating either
350 Chernev & Blair, supra note 254, at 1413. The authors define the halo effect as the “tendency
of overall evaluations of a person/object to influence evaluations of the specific properties of that
person/object in a way that is consistent with the overall evaluation.” Id. at 1414. For example, “health
and nutrient-content claims on food packages induce a ‘health halo’ that leads people to rate these
products higher on other health attributes not mentioned in the claims.” Id. at 1414.
351 Id. at 1413. It is worth noting that “higher fit initiatives produce, in general, more positive
consumer responses.” Sankar Sen, Shuili Du & C.B. Bhattacharya, Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Consumer Psychology Perspective, 10 CURRENT OP. IN PSYCH. 70, 71 (2016).
352 Chernev & Blair, supra note 254, at 1415, 1418; Sankar Sen & C.B. Bhattacharya, Does Doing
Good Always Lead to Doing Better? Consumer Reactions to Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 J. MKTG.
RSCH. 225, 238-39 (2001).
353 Chernev & Blair, supra note 254, at 1415
354 Sen, Du & Bhattacharya, supra note 351, at 238-39.
355 Chernev & Blair, supra note 254, at 1414-1420.
356 Id. at 1416.
357 Id.
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that companies donate to charity because “they believe it is the moral thing
to do” (benevolence/moral reasons) or “because they want the publicity”
(selfish reasons). Participants were then asked what they thought about
companies that make donations for either “moral” or “selfish” reasons.358 Half
of the participants were then given information about the company’s
significant donations to charities.359 Finally, all of the participants were asked
to evaluate how effective a hair-loss treatment was by examining before-andafter photos.360 The authors observed an interaction effect for those
participants exposed to the corporate benevolence/moral message and
informed about the firm’s charitable donations: these participants rated the
hair-loss treatment as more effective.361 In contrast, those who were informed
about the firm’s charitable donations primed with a message about corporate
selfishness/publicity did not perceive the treatment to be more effective than
the control group, who were not provided any information about the firm’s
charitable donations.362 In other words, “the positive halo of corporate social
responsibility can be weakened in cases when consumers believe that the firm
is motivated by self-interest rather than benevolence.”363
Chernev and Blair’s third experiment tested whether the source of the
information about the firm’s charitable giving mattered, altering whether this
information came from the firm itself or an independent third party, like a
news source.364 The aim of this test was to assess how skeptical consumers are
about the motivation of a firm that makes self-serving statements in
advertising its CSR. The experiment demonstrated a second interaction
effect: consumers who learned information about a firm’s charitable giving
from an independent source rated the tooth-whitening treatment as more
effective than the control group (those who did not receive information about
the firm’s CSR at all).365 However, participants who learned about the firm’s
CSR from the firm’s own advertising rated the treatment as essentially as the
same as the control group (those who did not receive any information about
the firm’s CSR).366 As in the second experiment, the firm’s perceived
motivation for engaging in CSR affected whether consumers rated the
products more highly.

358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366

Id. at 1417.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1418.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The fourth experiment attempted to test whether a participant’s
underlying views about the importance of firms “giving back to society”
affected the impact of firm motivation on perceptions of product
performance.367 The participants who “believed more strongly in the
importance of social goodwill” and who were also primed with information
about the firm’s benevolent motive for its CSR concluded that the scanning
technology performed better than those primed with information about the
firm’s self-interested motive (which did not match their own).368 For those
who cared less about the importance of social goodwill and firms giving back
to society, the difference in the firm’s motivation was irrelevant to their
perceptions of product performance.369 In other words, whether the firm’s
motivation matters depends on the moral values of the consumers.370 This
last finding is consistent with that of Sen and Bhattacharya, who concluded
that consumer responses to CSR depend upon the degree of perceived
“overlap” between the firm’s CSR efforts and their own character.371
The lesson for firms here is that there is evidence for firms to undertake
CSR based on the second (purely strategic) motivation, as well as a mixed
motivation of doing good and strategically increasing brand awareness. A firm
that seeks to increase its profits can do so by aligning its “values” with those of
its customers by making charitable contributions or otherwise participating in
CSR. In other words, firms can both create economic benefits and benefit
society.372 However, the firm must “internalize societal values and align its
motivation with these values.”373 In addition, it is beneficial for a neutral third
party to speak about the firm’s CSR programs to dampen speculation or
concern that the firm is simply making self-serving statements in its
advertising.374
It is worth noting that some scholars have suggested that consumers perceive
firm motivations to be more than simply a binary choice between “other-centered”
and “self-centered.”375 Rather, these motivations can be a combination of either
values-driven or stakeholder-driven on one axis, and strategic or egoistic on the

Id. at 1420-22.
Id. at 1421.
Id.
Id.
Sen & Bhattacharya, supra note 352, at 228; see also Sen, Du & Bhattacharya, supra note 351,
at 71 (reviewing relevant literature).
372 Chernev & Blair, supra note 253, at 1421-22 (discussing the notion of “shared value” posited
by Porter & Kramer, supra note 344).
373 Id. at 1422.
374 Id. at 1420-23.
375 Pam Scholder Ellen, Deborah J. Webb & Lois A. Mohr, Building Corporate Associations:
Consumer Attributions for Corporate Social Responsibility Programs, 34 J. ACAD. MKTG. SCI. 147, 149 (2006).
367
368
369
370
371
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other.376 The most positive combination is values-driven and strategic, while the
most negative is stakeholder-driven and egoistic.377 Others have concluded that
when a brand “positions itself on CSR, integrating CSR with its core business
strategy,” the firm is more likely to generate long-term customer loyalty than when
a CSR program is more fleeting.378
The most cynical explanation for these activities is that they are a form of
corporate greenwashing. A firm engages in greenwashing when it misleads
consumers or the broader public about the environmental performance of a
product or service, or of the firm itself.379 In other words, some corporate
concessioners and donors provide funds or services to the parks in order to
boost their public reputation for environmental bona fides, which is not in fact
genuine. In a clear case of greenwashing outside the national parks context,
LG Electronics self-certified certain of its refrigerators under the Energy-Star
label when they did not meet the energy-efficiency standards.380 Other firms
have used vague claims that their products are “all-natural,” or made accurate
but irrelevant claims about the environmental benefits of some aspect of a
product that is minimally important.381
There is some empirical basis for firms acting on this motivation as well.
In addition to improving perceptions of product performance, CSR can
insulate firms from negative word-of-mouth responses when their products or
services “fail,” if the CSR is both substantial and aligned with consumer
values.382 The effect is even stronger when firms employ CSR programs that
allow for consumer “choice” among beneficiaries, as this improves the “value
alignment” between the consumer and the firm.383 In other words, CSR can
serve as a “global insurance policy” against product or service failure, but only
when customers “perceive a high degree of alignment with the firm’s values.”384
One explanation for this effect is that customers whose values are aligned with
those of the firm’s CSR program “experience dissonance” if they choose to
respond in a negative way to a service or product failure if that firm has

Id.
Id. at 149-50.
Shuili Du, C.B. Bhattacharya & Sankar Sen, Reaping Relational Rewards from Corporate
Social Responsibility: The Role of Competitive Positioning, 24 INT’L J. RSCH. MKTG. 224, 224, 237 (2007).
379 Magali A. Delmas & Vanessa Cuerel Burbano, The Drivers of Greenwashing, 54 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 64, 66 (2011); William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43
J. BUS. ETHICS 253, 253, 255 (2003).
380 Delmas & Burbano, supra note 379, at 66.
381 Id. at 67 (citing the “seven sins” of greenwashing adopted by TerraChoice).
382 Jeff Joireman, Dustin Smith, Richie L. Liu & Jonathan Arthurs, It’s All Good: Corporate
Social Responsibility Reduces Negative and Promotes Positive Responses to Service Failures Among ValueAligned Customers, 34 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 32, 41-43 (2015).
383 Id. at 42.
384 Id.
376
377
378
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“facilitated their ability to have a positive impact on society.”385 If, however, a
customer’s values are not aligned with those of the firm’s CSR, there can be
an increase in negative word of mouth and negative reaction to a service or
product failure, as compared to a situation in which there was no CSR in the
first place.386 It is important to note the limitation of this finding with respect
to the seriousness of the failures: the service failures in Joireman et al.’s studies
were an “unusually long wait time and incorrect drink order” at a coffee
shop.387 They acknowledge that their study did not address the most serious
types of service failures by firms, such as environmental disasters, defective
products that cause significant harm, or corporate fraud, for example.388
B. Potential Effects on the Parks
With this deeper understanding of what motivates corporations to build
relationships with the parks, this section explores the impact of these nonextractive corporate relationships on the parks themselves. When two entities
are associated with one another, the association has multi-directional impacts.
There are benefits to the parks, but also potential harms. The benefits in cash
and in-kind donations may make it easier for parks to fulfill their missions.
Yet each of these corporate interactions can also lead to some loss of
publicness, often (though not always) in a different way from the concerns
expressed in the early years. These risks include the risk of co-optation,
associative risk, a risk of loss of support for public funding of the parks, and
finally the risk of public exclusion from enjoyment of the parks.
1. Benefits to the Parks
The benefits to the parks are straightforward: the most important is
financial support, which may be extremely valuable to fill gaps in operating
budgets. In addition, corporate sponsors can share and transfer expertise to
the parks, which can increase the efficiency and scope of their operations. As
noted earlier, the NPF has received millions of dollars from corporate
donations, enabling the parks to engage in many significant programs that
otherwise might not have existed. Philanthropy to the parks has supported
the digitization of oral histories at the Flight 93 National Memorial and
Stonewall National Monument; awarded millions of dollars in field trip
grants to more than 2000 schools, largely from underserved communities;
supported youth conservation and service corps trips; trained teachers in
385
386
387
388

Id.
Id. at 43. The authors refer to this as “CSR backlash.” Id.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 44.
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using the national parks to support their curricula; and enabled children to
participate in “citizen science” programs at the parks.389 From concessions,
the national parks receive important services and accommodations for
visitors, as well as a share of the profits from the concessioners in the form of
fees. Finally, from cause-related marketing, the parks may be publicized to
groups of people who have never visited or thought about visiting them.
2. Harms to the Parks
The potential harms and risks of corporate sponsorship and relationships
with non-profit public sector entities like the parks include (a) the potential for
co-optation, (b) stigma-by-association, (c) an erosion of support for public
funding of the parks, and in extreme cases (d) exclusion of the public.390 The
first three of these are substantively different from the early concerns about
exclusion and commodification, and operate as more indirect assaults on the
publicness of the parks. The fourth is more consistent with those early concerns.
a. Co-optation
The first concern is that corporate activity within the parks will lead to
co-optation of the NPS. In the context of relationships between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations, Baur and Schmitz
define co-optation as “the process of aligning NGO interests with those of
corporations.”391 In other words, powerful groups (often private corporations)
seek to “water[] down” the interests of the non-profit or public sector entity
to benefit the private corporation’s interests.392 Co-optation can arise as a
result of “sponsoring relationships, labeling agreements, and the personal ties
established with corporate leaders.”393 Research suggests, for example, that
NGOs that develop relationships with corporations may be less likely to
389 NAT’L PARK FOUND., supra note 28, at 12-13. Note that this a partial listing of the benefits
of partnerships and is not limited only to corporate contributions.
390 There is a substantial literature discussing the impact of “co-branding” between for-profit
and non-profit entities, some of which is relevant here. See, e.g., Stavros P. Kalafatis, Natalia
Remizova, Debra Riley & Jaywant Singh, The Differential Impact of Brand Equity on B2B Co-Branding,
27 J. BUS. & INDUS. MKTG. 623 (2012); Judith Washburn, Brian D. Till & Randi Priluck, Cobranding: Brand Equity and Trial Effects, 17 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 591, 591-604 (2000); Sonia
Dickinson & Alison Barker, Evaluations of Branding Alliances Between Non-Profit and Commercial
Brand Partners: The Transfer of Affect, 12 INT’L J. NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR MKTG. 75,
75–89 (2007); McDonnell et al., supra note 23, at 7-8.
391 Baur & Schmitz, supra note 342, at 9-10 (noting that corporations seek “enhanced
legitimacy” through associations with NGOs in corporate social responsibility initiatives, while
NGOs obtain revenue and influence).
392 Cf. id. at 11 (focusing on groups that are protesting corporate practices, rather than entities
accepting donations, though there are similarities).
393 Id. at 10.
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protest the actions of their corporate partners and tend to move to more
moderate strategies of accommodation.394
An analog of co-optation in the regulatory context is regulatory capture,
in which a regulated industry “captures” the regulator through cozy
relationships and revolving doors in ways that ultimately influence policy.395
The Made in America Outdoor Recreation Advisory Committee could be
seen as an example of either regulatory capture or co-optation of the NPS, as
it was largely staffed with industry representatives.396
In the analogous context of donations by wealthy individuals or
foundations to support government projects or services like education,
outdoor monuments and parks, health care, or community programs (also
known as “patriotic philanthropy”), Margaret Lemos and Guy-Uriel Charles
have suggested the risk that “gifts to government may undermine norms of
collective self-government by enabling certain individuals—wealthy ones—to
exert outsized influence on public policy.”397 This can come in the form of
problematic public decisions (such as a wealthy alumnus’s temporarily
successful efforts to force the University of North Dakota to keep the name
and mascot “Fighting Sioux” by offering $100 million to build a new hockey
arena with the name and logo prominently displayed). It can also lead to
decisions that are more redistributive (such as private foundation support for
public schools serving predominantly African-American children in the South
when the states did not provide sufficient financial support).398 In other words,
they posit that “gifts . . . are not entirely free.”399 One dividing line between
gifts that are more or less problematic is whether the government entity
continues to define its own goals, and donors may merely contribute to goals
set through democratic procedures.400 More problematic in this context are
those situations in which the donor can set the government’s agenda.
Co-optation can result from corporate sponsorships when the NGO or
public sector entity becomes dependent upon the resources of the sponsor.401

Id. at 11.
On the phenomenon of regulatory capture, see Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll &
Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
243 (1987); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 167 (1990); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18-19 (2010); Richard B.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1685 (1975).
396 See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
397 Lemos & Charles, supra note 36, at 1170.
398 Id. at 1167-77.
399 Id. at 1177.
400 Cf. id. at 1179 (citing the “less worrisome” system of competitive grants or governmentinitiated programs).
401 Baur & Schmitz, supra note 342, at 13.
394
395
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These sponsorship relationships create a new class of stakeholders who are
important to the non-profit organization, and who, according to Baur and
Schmitz, might crowd out the importance of other stakeholders who do not
contribute financially, including the more diffuse beneficiaries of the NGO’s
mission.402
This risk of interference with public decision making is real. One
prominent example of co-optation in the parks involved Coca-Cola, which
had donated more than $13 million to the NPF. Coca-Cola objected to the
NPS’s proposed plan to ban plastic water bottle sales in the Grand Canyon
National Park.403 At the time, plastic water bottles accounted for
approximately thirty percent of the waste generated within the parks.404 In
light of Coca-Cola’s objection, the NPS did not implement the ban.405 After
public backlash, the NPS reversed its policy and imposed the ban.406
Subsequent reports demonstrated that the plastic bottle ban “resulted in
yearly savings of up to two million water bottles.”407 In 2017, the NPS again
lifted the ban.408
A second, more normatively ambiguous example involves a donation from
Delta Airlines of $83,500 to keep the Martin Luther King, Jr. National
Historic Park open on the federal holiday bearing King’s name in 2019.409 At
the time, the rest of the federal government was shut down. While the public
has an interest in the parks being open to them, because Delta was able to
402 Id. at 14 (“As NGOs increasingly add corporate actors to the list of external stakeholders
to which they feel directly obliged, donors remain the dominant focus of accountability and
beneficiaries will have an even more difficult time to be heard.”).
403 Felicity Barringer, Parks Chief Blocked Plan for Grand Canyon Bottle Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
9, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/science/earth/parks-chief-blocked-plan-for-grandcanyon-bottle-ban.html [https://perma.cc/VRT5-L47P].
404 Id.
405 Id.
406 For example, a Change.org petition called for the NPS to reimpose the ban. Stiv Wilson,
Save the Grand Canyon from Coca Cola! Ban Plastic Bottles in the Park, CHANGE.ORG,
https://www.change.org/p/save-the-grand-canyon-from-coca-cola-ban-plastic-bottles-in-the-park
[https://perma.cc/5NBM-VFVB].
407 Darryl Fears, The National Park Service Showed that Its Bottled Water Ban Worked—Then
Lifted It, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/09/26/the-national-park-service-showed-that-its-bottled-water-ban-workedthen-lifted-it [https://perma.cc/2L5K-MQL9].
408 Id.; National Park Service Ends Effort to Eliminate Sale of Disposable Water Bottles, NAT’L PARK
SERV.
(Aug.
16,
2017),
https://www.nps.gov/orgs/1207/08-16-2017-water-bottles.htm
[https://perma.cc/853Y-JBJS].
409 Martin Luther King, Jr. National Historical Park to Reopen After Grant from the Delta Airlines
Foundation, DELTA NEWS HUB, https://news.delta.com/martin-luther-king-jr-national-historicalpark-reopen-after-grant-delta-air-lines-foundation [https://perma.cc/5XQ9-7XBT]; Martin Luther
King, Jr. National Historical Park to Open Thanks to Grant from The Delta Airlines Foundation, NAT’L
PARK
SERV.
(Jan.
17,
2019),
https://www.nps.gov/malu/learn/news/deltagrant.htm
[https://perma.cc/LK8T-E3FR].
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select a park unit of concern to it, rather than to make a donation to the NPS
to make a determination about which park units should be reopened, at least
one scholar has argued that the opening reflected a private concern, rather than a
necessarily public one.410
Corporate gifts can have an impact on the decisions of government
actors—to ban or not to ban plastic water bottles or to keep a site open that
is of interest to the donor corporation. Lemos and Charles argue that even
when “well-meaning citizens contribute their fortunes to support a vision of
the public good—and where the immediate consequences seem, at worst,
innocuous,” private financing of government remains a concern.411 If only
major corporations like Delta and Coca-Cola, but not ordinary citizens, can
influence NPS decisions in a concrete way, then we should be concerned
about an erosion of democratic legitimacy, as well as distributive justice
considerations in these relationships between corporations and the
government.412 It is arguably less problematic if such sponsorship goes to
support existing programs defined by the NPS or Park Superintendents,
much as it is less problematic when the NPS writes the terms of a bid for a
concession contract. The key point is that the risk of co-optation is higher,
and the legitimacy deficit increases, when corporate activity within the parks
spells an erosion of public decision making authority and control.
b. Associative Risk
A second potential harm to the parks is associative risk. The concern is
that negative publicity about the corporate sponsor will tarnish the reputation
of the public sector or non-profit recipient of the sponsorship.413 Pontikes,
Negro and Rao addressed this type of risk in their study of the impact of
“stigma by association” on artists who had worked with blacklisted artists in
Hollywood during the “red scare.”414 They found that when an artist’s coworker was blacklisted, the artist’s chances of working again in a feature film

410 Jon D. Michaels, Essay, We the Shareholders: Government Market Participation in the Postliberal
U.S. Political Economy, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 465, 498 (2020).
411 Lemos & Charles, supra note 36, at 1135.
412 Id., at 1181 (raising an objection to gifts from wealthy individuals based on the norm of
“equal political citizenship”). The authors note, however, that gifts to public parks tend to be more
redistributive in nature than ordinary philanthropic gifts by individuals to government entities
(which tend not to be redistributive, on average). Id. at 1184 (“Even if located in an exclusive
neighborhood . . . a public park is still open to the public.”).
413 Mowen, Kyle & Jackowski, supra note 338, at 96.
414 Elizabeth Pontikes, Giacomo Negro & Hayagreeva Rao, Stained Red: A Study of Stigma by
Association to Blacklisted Artists During the ‘Red Scare’ in Hollywood, 1945 to 1960, 75 AM. SOCIOL. REV.
456 (2010).
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were reduced, even after a single association with that co-worker.415
McDonnell and Werner applied the concept of “associative risk” or “stigmaby-association” to corporations and their affiliates in a recent study, which
found that corporations targeted by boycotts created an “associative risk” for
politicians who were the recipients of the firms’ corporate political activity.416
They defined “associative risk” as the “perceived likelihood of accruing
incidental damage by virtue of their mere association with a reputationally
compromised organization.”417
Associative risk increased when a corporation subject to boycotts had
donated to a politician. In such cases, politicians were significantly more
likely to refund campaign contributions from boycotted firms than from nonboycotted firms.418 In addition, corporate officers from boycotted firms were
significantly less likely to be invited to participate in congressional hearings
than officers from non-boycotted firms and boycotted firms were significantly
less likely to be awarded government procurement contracts than nonboycotted firms.419
While McDonnell and Werner’s study focused on the associative risk and
subsequent efforts of elected officials to distance themselves from targeted
firms,420 other stakeholder groups can suffer reputational harm when
associated with a firm whose reputation has been tarnished. For example,
many museums, including the Metropolitan Museum of Art, have stated that
they will no longer accept gifts from the Sackler family, whose firm, Purdue
Pharma, manufactured and sold the opioid OxyContin, which has caused
devastating effects in the opioid crisis.421 Many universities have likewise
been “tainted” by their association with sexual predator Jeffrey Epstein, who
donated millions to schools including Harvard, MIT, and others in an effort
to burnish his own reputation.422
415 Id. at 456-57. While their study focused on the red scare, the authors note that the
phenomenon is generalizable to other contexts, such as when “companies are targeted as sweatshops,
the taint could mistakenly spread to partners or suppliers who have upstanding labor practices,” or
when “drug use is uncovered in a sport, advertisers may pull sponsorships from all teams or even
related sports.” Id. at 457; see also id. at 459 (listing other studies demonstrating stigma by association).
416 Mary-Hunter McDonnell & Timothy Werner, Blacklisted Businesses: Social Activists’
Challenges and the Disruption of Corporate Political Activity, 61 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 584, 585-87 (2016).
417 Id. at 587.
418 Id. at 602.
419 See id. at 602-04 (finding support for these three hypotheses).
420 Id. at 610.
421 Peggy McGlone, Citing Opioid Ties, the Met Says It Will No Longer Accept Gifts from the Sackler Family,
WASH. POST (May 15, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/museums/citingopioid-ties-the-met-says-it-will-no-longer-accept-gifts-from-the-sackler-family/2019/05/15/e66ac2d8-774211e9-b7ae-390de4259661_story.html [https://perma.cc/YL95-3R66].
422 Susan Svrluga, Epstein’s Donations to Universities Reveal a Painful Truth About Philanthropy,
WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2019, 4:24 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/epsteins-
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Likewise, if a major corporation were to engage in a public cause-related
marketing campaign with the national parks, and then were subject to a
serious corporate scandal, it is possible that the taint of the scandal would, by
association, affect the parks and the public goodwill that the NPS has built
up over more than 100 years. For this reason, perhaps, regulations and
guidance governing philanthropy to the parks prohibit donations from
tobacco firms and the proceeds of illegal activity. But in the context of the
national parks, it may be the case that an associative taint arises out of the
mere fact that a corporate sponsor is a private entity rather than the public
itself. This area is worthy of additional empirical research.
c. Erosion in Support for Public Funds
A third potential harm to the parks’ publicness is that private sponsorship,
profits from concessions, and cause-related marketing will erode support for
public funding of public entities.423 This issue of concern arises not only in
the context of the national parks, but also in the broader context of private
philanthropy from individuals and foundations to fund health care, education,
museums, drug treatment programs, and other community development
programs.424 The concern is that the public may be less interested in public
funding for programs if they think the private funding is sufficient, or they
may simply not perceive the government to need funding because it appears
to be doing well.425

donations-to-universities-reveal-a-painful-truth-about-philanthropy/2019/09/04/e600adae-c86d11e9-a4f3c081a126de70_story.html [https://perma.cc/3YH4-F2MF].
423 Mowen, Kyle & Jackowski, supra note 338, at 97. Indeed, in the early years, very little was
appropriated for park budgets, with the thought that visitor fees and private concessions would be sufficient
in lieu of public funds.
424 Lemos & Charles, supra note 36, at 1156, 1158-69 (discussing concerns about the “crowding
out” of support for public funds for health and education among other public programs as a result
of philanthropy to government by wealthy individuals and foundations, but not focusing on
corporate giving); see also id. at 1163-68 (discussing patriotic philanthropy in the context of public
facilities like community centers, and public spaces (like parks, museums and monuments) such as
David Rubenstein’s $7.5 million gift to the NPS to fix a crack in the Washington Monument, and
analogous gifts to public schools and museums from individuals and foundations); Arthur C. Brooks,
Public Subsidies and Charitable Giving: Crowding out, Crowding in, or Both?, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 451 (2000) (suggesting that public and private support may not be incompatible).
425 In the context of philanthropy to government by private, wealthy individuals, Lemos and
Charles characterize this concern as a potential “hollowing effect.” Lemos & Charles, supra note 36,
at 1134. They contend that citizens may be unable make “informed choices” about government
because the philanthropic gifts may mask the government’s true capacity to act; in other words,
governments do more than they could in the absence of philanthropy, which “paper[s] over the
government’s weaknesses” or financial incapacities. Id. To address this concern, they prescribe
transparency, so that citizens can know what private financial support exists for public programs and
therefore do not under- or over-estimate the state’s capacity. Id. at 1186-88.
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This narrative raises an empirical question. Empirically, is it in fact true
that corporate giving to national parks erodes support for public spending on
the parks? It is also possible that corporate philanthropy can increase support
for public funding, or is neutral and has no effect. This question is capable of
empirical testing. While this hypothesis that private funding will crowd out
public funding appears frequently in legal scholarship, there appears to be
little empirical evidence on this precise question.
However, several studies have examined an analogous issue: whether
private environmental governance—private actions by firms or industries to
engage in pro-environmental behavior426—has any effect on support for
public environmental law or regulation. For example, several scholars recently
found that widespread industry adoption by corporations of private
environmental governance (a commitment to use recycled content in
packaging, or to manufacture vehicles with high fuel efficiency) significantly
reduced support among environmental activists, members of the public, and
government officials for public regulation on the same issues.427 In contrast,
one working paper has found positive, rather than negative, spillover effects
toward support for public climate policy when participants learn about
private efforts to mitigate climate change.428 The authors found that when
participants learned about private climate governance initiatives by
corporations, conservatives and moderates were more supportive of public
climate mitigation policies rather than less supportive.429 A third recent study
found that private corporate environmental governance “can increase public
support for legislation,” but that the effect is likewise focused in moderate
and conservative members of the public, who are more likely to trust
corporations as credible sources than more liberal members of the public.430
426 See, e.g., Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental
Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 1 (2015) (defining and discussing private environmental
governance); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129
(2013) (same).
427 Neil Malhotra, Benoît Monin, & Michael Tomz, Does Private Regulation Preempt Public
Regulation?, 113 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 19, 32 (2019). For members of the public and government
officials, this reduction in support for government regulation arose even when the corporate action
was relatively small (e.g., a commitment to use thirty percent recycled content in plastic packaging),
although for environmental activists there was a larger difference between the effect of a shallow
commitment and a deep commitment on support for government regulation, with a shallow
commitment leading to a smaller decrease in support for public regulation. Id. at 23, 26, 28.
428 Ash Gillis, Michael Vandenbergh, Kaitlin Rami, Alexander Maki & Ken Wallston, Private
Sector Action Can Reduce U.S. Conservatives’ and Moderates’ Opposition to Climate Change Mitigation
(unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author).
429 Id.
430 See David A. Dana & Janice Nadler, Regulation, Public Attitudes, and Private Governance, 16
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 69, 69, 84 (2019) (studying the impact of private corporate action on
support for public policy on sustainable forestry and cage-free eggs). Similar studies could be done
to test support for public mask mandates in the wake of announcements by major retailers like
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This study posits that corporate action leads more conservative members of
the public to believe that a problem actually exists and is not illusory.431
These studies tested whether private environmental governance by
corporations erodes or increases support for public policy or regulation. Thus,
testing whether corporate philanthropy reduces or increases support for
public funding is likewise possible. Such testing could be conducted through
surveys, where participants are exposed to information about private funding
for the parks and asked their views on public financial support for the
parks.432
Notably, however, there is one data point to contradict this negative
spillover hypothesis. In July, 2020, Congress presented to the President for
signature the Great American Outdoors Act.433 On August 4, 2020, the
President signed the Act into law.434 Passed by overwhelming bipartisan
majorities in both the House (310 to 107) and Senate (73 to 25),435 the law will
provide up to $9.5 billion over five years in a trust fund to address the
maintenance backlog at the national parks.436
Thus, it remains important to acknowledge the possibility that private
funding can have both positive and negative spillover effects on support for
public funding of the parks. The direction and magnitude of that effect are
capable of empirical testing and are worthy of further study.
d. Exclusion of the Public
Finally, a fourth potential harm can arise in extreme circumstances—
exclusion. A well-publicized example of Pepsi’s and the NFL’s corporate
Walmart, Starbucks, Kohl’s, Walgreens, Publix, Target, and CVS that masks are required during the
COVID-19 crisis. Bill Saporito, Meet the New C.D.C. Director: Walmart, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/opinion/walmart-coronavirus-masks.html
[https://perma.cc/KF7X-YY97].
431 Dana & Nadler, supra note 430, at 72.
432 In one study, Elke Weber found that farmers who act to mitigate climate change “become
less concerned about the overall effects of climate change,” even if their actions have no appreciable
impact on risk reduction. MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND
POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 93 (explaining
Weber’s study and discussing possible negative spillover effects of private climate mitigation on
support for government climate mitigation) (citing Elke U. Weber, Perception and Expectation of
Climate Change: Precondition for Economic and Technological Adaptation, in ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS,
AND BEHAVIOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUATION AND DEGRADATION 314
(Max H. Bazerman, David M. Messick, Ann E. Tenbrunsel & Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni eds., 1997).
433 Actions
Overview H.R. 1957 – 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONG.,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1957/actions
[https://perma.cc/HF85NQE8]; see S. 3422, 116th Cong. (2020) (enacted).
434 Great American Outdoors Act, Pub. L. No. 116-152, § 200402 13 Stat. 682, 683-86 (2020)
(codified at 54 U.S.C. § 200401).
435 Actions Overview H.R. 1957 – 116th Congress (2019-2020), supra note 433.
436 § 200402, 13 Stat. at 683-86 (2020).
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sponsorship of an event at the National Mall generated significant criticism,
leading to a change in the law to prevent such exclusion from the Mall in the
future. This example is important because it highlights the recognition by the
NPS that exclusion of the public can—but should not—happen as a result of
corporate activity. However, while the law now prohibits such exclusion on the
Mall, it remains possible that such exclusion could occur elsewhere.
In 2003, the National Football League (NFL) was authorized to use the
National Mall in Washington, D.C. (which is a unit of the National Park
System) for its annual season kickoff event.437 The NFL sought additional
corporate sponsors for the event, and PepsiCo contributed $2.5 million to
what ultimately became known as “NFL Kickoff Live 2003 From the National
Mall Presented by Pepsi Vanilla.”438 The event included a concert headlined
by Britney Spears.439 In the week leading up to the event, members of the
public could not access the Mall because of the “stage, fencing, Jumbotrons,
giant tents and signs,” including banners promoting Pepsi Vanilla.440 Two
weeks later, Congress passed legislation prohibiting the use of federal funds
for events on the National Mall unless the permit prohibits the “erection,
placement, or use of structures and signs bearing commercial advertising” on
the Mall.441 While acknowledgement of event sponsors is permitted, such
recognition “shall be consistent with the special nature and sanctity of the
Mall” and letters may not be larger than a defined size.442
While perhaps such exclusion is less likely in the more spacious settings
of national parks than on the National Mall, and thus the legislation focused
on the Mall in Congress’s backyard, it remains the case that non-extractive
corporate activity like cause-related marketing can, in extreme cases, result in
the exclusion of the public.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This final section concludes that the NPS should not be complacent about
the risks of harm that arose in the parks’ early years—exclusion of the public,
the removal or extraction of commodities for sale in markets, and the parks’
physical destruction. However, the associative and expressive harms to the
437 Nick Greene, When Britney Spears and Pepsi Got the NFL Banned from the National Mall,
SLATE (Sept. 5, 2019, 10:51 AM) https://slate.com/culture/2019/09/nfl-banned-kickoff-show-2003britney-spears-national-mall.html [https://perma.cc/5TQT-4PSX]. The event was organized to
demonstrate public support for U.S. troops shortly after Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced. Id.
438 Id.
439 Id.
440 Id.
441 Act of Nov. 10, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-108, § 145, 117 Stat. 1241, 1280 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1a-1 note).
442 Id.
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parks that can arise from the non-extractive relationships with corporations
that this Article has identified deserve greater attention, both in scholarship
and policy. For example, more empirical scholarship is needed to determine
whether corporate donations lead members of the public to be more or less
supportive of public funding for the parks. Likewise, more empirical work
could determine whether mere association of the parks with private corporate
donors or concessioners—even with firms untainted by scandal—exposes the
parks to stigma-by-association.
With respect to park governance and policy, a nuanced approach must
take into account not only the tangible consequences of such relationships—
both good and bad—but intangible ones as well. With respect to tangible
harms, as the above discussion reflects, early promoters of public parks argued
that if private interests were permitted to encroach on the publicness of the
parks, even small private interests could ultimately destroy the parks
themselves.443 They did not wish to allow the parks to turn into another overcommercialized Niagara Falls.444 While expressed in different forms, these
concerns about private ownership of natural wonders generally echoed the
ways in which we traditionally think about the bundle of sticks that makes up
private property, including concerns about exclusion and destruction that
dramatically unfolded in the early years and motivated the creation of the
parks and limits on private action.
Some expressed the fear that private ownership of natural wonders would
permit the physical exclusion of members of the public from enjoying them.
Others were concerned that private ownership of nearby property or access
routes would permit private interests to charge entry fees that would limit
access. With respect to destruction, early experiences with development in
the Yosemite Valley led to concerns that private interests would physically
remove assets, like timber, from the parks, or that private interests would
physically destroy the lands, as in the case of over-grazing. Even in the
absence of tolls and fees, the public cannot enjoy these natural wonders if
they no longer exist. The laws and regulations adopted by Congress and the
NPS demonstrate generally adequate responses to these early concerns. They
limit development, impose limits on private concessions to those that are
“necessary and appropriate,” and negate private claims to natural wonders like
Yellowstone’s geysers themselves.
But there has been, and there remains some role for private corporate
action within the parks, even if that role is necessarily limited. Such private
activity undoubtedly includes private concessions, and some private
philanthropic support, including cause-related marketing. These forms of
443
444

See supra Parts II–III.
See supra notes 131–132 and accompanying text.
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corporate activity do not implicate the core concerns about exclusion,
commodification, and destruction that have long motivated park governance.
Whether the Ahwahnee Hotel retains its historic name or is renamed the
Historic Yosemite Lodge does not prevent visitors to Yosemite from staying
in its rooms. And corporate philanthropy and cause-related marketing
arguably have the potential to help the national parks by providing funds to
maintain trails, improve the quality of ranger stations, or do other needed
maintenance. In other words, not only do these forms of corporate action not
implicate exclusion or the right to destroy, the exact opposite may be true.
Accommodations provide access. And funding can support trail maintenance.
Funding can also support access for underserved or disadvantaged groups. So
how should park governance accommodate or even encourage the more
positive aspects of these relationships while guarding against their potential
drawbacks?
One approach might be to suggest that corporate relationships with and
sponsorship of the parks could be harnessed to combat the harms of exclusion
and destruction that are core to the publicness of the parks. For example, if
private donations were significant, the parks could potentially waive entrance
fees for some or all visitors. Private corporate concessioners could likewise
reduce fees or adopt a sliding scale of fees to encourage visits from underserved
members of the community. Such benefits could be required as features of
concession contracts, rather than merely adopted through private generosity.
Such a requirement would go a step further to promote public access to the parks
than the provision added during the trademark dispute that essentially prohibits
concessioners from seeking to trademark the historic names of park amenities.
But valuing these potentially positive consequences of corporate action
should not come at the expense of acknowledging intangible harms. For
example, even when corporate funding or concessions can improve access to
the parks, these relationships nonetheless raise concerns that they are
promoting some degree of private control or co-optation. Whether this is
control of the governance agenda, or control of space, the concern is that
private corporate activity within the parks may diminish (or appear to
diminish) control by the public agency and its officials who have a
responsibility to act in the public interest. To address this concern about cooptation, perhaps the law should not only restrict naming rights within the
parks, but also make clear that decisions about how the donated money is to
be spent must be determined, first and foremost, by the NPS, local park
superintendents, or equivalent state officials. One way to do this would be to
require the NPF to seek donations for particular, existing programs, rather
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than to accept funds designated for programs of interest to the sponsors.445
Another option would be to follow the example set by Michigan, in which
members of the public can vote on which of several programs should receive
the private contributions. Alternatively, all funding could simply be donated
to support the general NPS account, rather than to be earmarked for special
programs.
Regardless of whether corporate activity promotes beneficial
consequences—such as increased visits among communities that have
previously been unable to access the parks—private corporate activity also
raises expressive, intangible concerns. The legal rules governing the parks
must likewise take these expressive considerations into account. For example,
as Sax, Rose, and the Supreme Court have all suggested, public funding for
parks and monuments express something about our nation’s collective
commitments.446 The corollary to this view is that private funding itself can
undermine this expression of a national commitment to these treasures—
regardless of the consequences on support for public funding. At a more
abstract level, therefore, these relationships raise the question of whether
corporate association with the parks dilutes their status as symbols of the
nation and their role in civic nation-building.447 By associating with these
popular parks, corporations undoubtedly benefit. But if the parks receive
funds from corporate, rather than public, sources they could lose their
expressive value in demonstrating the public commitment toward preserving
places of wonder and awe. As noted above, even when individuals do not
themselves visit the parks, they nonetheless derive benefits from knowing
that such places exist. As the Supreme Court pointed out in the Gettysburg
case, the fact that the government was setting aside land to commemorate the
Battle at Gettysburg was itself meaningful, as evidence of a public
commitment to the history of the nation.
Keeping these normative principles in mind, perhaps the best way to
conceptualize the dispute over the trademark to the name of the historic
hotels and properties within Yosemite National Park, despite its nonextractive nature, is that it too, was an effort to stake out a private “claim” to
a wonder within the parks. Not a natural wonder, the Ahwahnee Hotel (and
the other landmarked features) had become so intertwined with the goodwill
of the parks that they came to be understood by the public as part of what the
parks are. And perhaps the best way to conceptualize the issue of
philanthropy and cause-related marketing is that, even though they are non445 Of course, it would likely be very difficult to police pre-donation conversations that shape
the park superintendents’ agendas.
446 See supra notes 84–99 and accompanying text.
447 See supra Section II.B.
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extractive in nature, they nonetheless allow private firms to remove some
aspect of goodwill from the public domain by making these national symbols
more closely associated with private sponsors. In other words, park managers
and regulators ought to be concerned about these intangible risks of harm to
the parks, including co-optation, stigma-by-association, negative spillovers
with respect to public funding, and the potential (in extreme cases) for
corporate activity to exclude, rather than to include, members of the public.
This Article has offered several suggestions to think about how to address
the implications of these new and old corporate relationships with the parks.
Most importantly, the Article has identified how these relationships, though
not traditionally “extractive” in the sense of taking something physical out of
the parks, may in fact be extractive in an intangible sense. While the
suggestions offered here are preliminary, the goal is to begin a discussion to
rethink these relationships. We would do well to remind ourselves that even
those relationships that do not extract physical commodities or exclude the
public can nonetheless erode public goodwill. And scholars and policymakers
should think more creatively about how to manage these relationships moving
forward.
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